Wye River Memorandum: A Transition to Final Peace by Weiner, Justus R.
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 24
Number 1 Fall 2000 Article 1
1-1-2000
Wye River Memorandum: A Transition to Final
Peace
Justus R. Weiner
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Justus R. Weiner, Wye River Memorandum: A Transition to Final Peace, 24 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol24/iss1/1
Wye River Memorandum:
A Transition to Final Peace?
BY JusTus R. WEINER*
Table of Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................... 2
I. Inception of the Wye River Memorandum ................................. 5
A. The Memorandum's Position in the Peace Process ............. 5
B. The Terms Agreed Upon ........................................................ 8
1. The Wye River Memorandum and Related Letters
from the United States ..................................................... 8
2. The Intricate "Time Line" .............................................. 9
C. Wye as Compared to Previous Interim Agreements .......... 12
D. The United States' Expanded Role ..................................... 21
1. The United States as "Peace Broker" .................... 21
2. The CIA ............................................................................ 29
II. Problems Arising Since the Signing of the Memorandum ........... 30
A. Immediate Doubts ................................................................ 32
B. Difficulties in Gauging Palestinian Compliance ................ 36
C. Jewish "Settlements" ............................................................. 37
III. A New Lease on Life for the Peace Process ............................. 38
A. Prospects for Continuation of the Peace Process .............. 39
B. Permanent Status Issues ........................................................ 44
1. Configuration of a Palestinian State ............................. 44
2. Palestinian Prisoners ...................................................... 46
* The author is an international human rights attorney and member of the
Israel and New York Bar Associations. He is currently a Scholar in Residence at the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and an adjunct lecturer at Hebrew and Tel Aviv
Universities. The author expresses his indebtedness to Ariel Fried, E. J. Bliner and
Judy Shulewitz for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
C. The Political and Religious Status of Jerusalem ................. 46
Conclusion and Outlook ..................................................................... 51
Postscript: The Al-Aqsa Intifada ...................................................... 55
Introduction
One of the most significant of a long series of agreements
designed to foster peace and stability in the Middle East is the Wye
River Memorandum ("WRM" or "Memorandum"). This agreement
emerged as the Clinton Administration's solution to the nineteen
month-long impasse in the peace process between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority ("PA"). Since the signing of the major interim
agreement ("Oslo II") in 1995, the peace process had been strained
and frequently deadlocked. The subsequent Hebron Protocol
("Protocol"), intended to resolve implementation and interpretation
difficulties, did not fully achieve these objectives, and, as a result, the
permanent status talks failed to register any substantive progress. In
March 1997, the negotiations came to a standstill. This stagnation
persisted, threatening the entire edifice built over some five years.
Even by the unusual standards of Middle East diplomacy, the
WRM was negotiated in peculiar political circumstances. In October
1998, President Clinton was plagued by a career-threatening scandal
and the prospect of removal from office. With his presidency in
jeopardy and the political naysayers calling for his resignation,
Clinton set his sights on foreign affairs. And so, Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu and PA Chairman Yasser Arafat, neither of
whom could afford not to heed the call of the President, were
summoned to the Wye Plantation in Maryland. Clinton was
decidedly intent on making some progress toward peace.
Sequestered on the serene plantation, Clinton sought to quell the
fears and inspire the confidence of each side. The President, with his
top foreign policy advisors in tow, distanced himself from the
Lewinsky scandal and challenged Netanyahu and Arafat to make
concessions that placed their political careers at risk. For his troubles,
Netanyahu was labeled a "traitor" by some Israelis and faced the
intense scrutiny of a nation plagued by the daily fear of terrorism.' At
the same time, Arafat contended with threats on his life by Hamas, a
1. See Danna Harman, A Patchy Deal Can Easily Unravel, JERUSALEM POST,
Nov. 6, 1998, at 13.
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terrorist group based in the Gaza Strip, and demonstrations in
Ramallah' Nevertheless, intense negotiations ensued between the
three parties.'
In spite of all obstacles, an innovative document was signed that
was intended to reduce distrust between Israelis and Palestinians
through the adoption of a timeline (intended to make tangible the
fulfillment of reciprocal commitments) and by further involving an
influential third party, the United States. Moreover, it was the
United States' belief that an additional interim agreement might
revive the stagnant peace process and thereby facilitate real progress
in the critical final status negotiations.
To understand the significance of the WRM, one must examine
the dynamics of the Israeli-American and Israeli-Palestinian
relationships in its aftermath. The interim period, which began at the
outset of the process in 1993, expired on May 4, 1999, leaving a
vacuum of uncertainty in the region.! This had been the initial target
date for completion of certain agreed aspects of the peace process.
Arafat threatened, as the expiration date neared, to leave the Oslo
framework altogether and to unilaterally declare a Palestinian State
Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu met this challenge with
the threat of dire consequences, possibly including annexation of
those parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip then under Israeli
control.6 Against this crosscurrent of political maneuvering, the
United States attempted to cool passions and rhetoric by suggesting a
one-year extension of the interim period to allow for the completion
of the peace process By this suggestion, the United States, with
diplomatic support from other states in the region and in Europe,
attempted to return the parties to the constructive, step-by-step
fulfillment of their obligations under the WRM.
Clinton did indeed endure, impeached but not convicted, while
the Likud government of Binyamin Netanyahu was toppled by his
right wing coalition partners, who initiated a vote of no confidence in
I See id.
3. See id.
4. See Marwan Rajab, No Sacred Dates, JERUSALEM TIMES, Apr. 16, 1999, at 5.
5. See Ben Lynfield et al. Palestinians Delay Decision on Statehood, JERUSALEM
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the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament).8 The WRM was then effectively
put on hold. Early elections followed and Netanyahu was decisively
defeated.9 Tired of the status quo, Israelis voiced their sentiments at
the polls. Ehud Barak triumphed, emerging as Prime Minister, the
choice of a nation in search of new leadership and a real, lasting peace
with the Palestinians."0 Hope for peace was quickly restored to many
in the region, Jews and Arabs alike.
The outcome of the peace process remained uncertain, however,
as many new controversies emerged from the ambiguous text of the
WRM. Moreover, worldwide speculation focused on the dramatic
regional developments after the signing of the agreement: the death
of King Hussein of Jordan followed by the forging of new ties
between his successor King Abdullah II and Syria,1 the election of a
new Israeli Prime Minister and his formation of a new coalition
government, 2 the United Nations' heightened involvement in the
peace process, 3 new Palestinian proposals calling for a heightened
return to the 1947 General Assembly partition plan,4 and Barak's
request for change in the WRM implementation schedule. 5
This Article will analyze the legal and political controversies,
present from the inception of the earlier Oslo II agreement, 6 and
which persist long after the expiration of the interim period on May 4,
8. See Gideon Alon et al., Early Vote Called; Parties in Havoc (Dec. 22, 1998)
<http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/old-scripts/open.asp?datee=12/22/98>.
9. See Final Vote Count, Prime Ministerial Race, JERUSALEM POST, May 23,
1999, at 3.
10. Labor Party candidate Ehud Barak won a decisive victory over incumbent
Likud Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in the May 1999 nationwide general
elections. In the author's opinion, Barak's victory is attributed to his status as the
most highly decorated soldier in the history of the Israeli Defense Forces, his
concentration on domestic rather than international social issues, and former Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's inability to resolve disputes between himself and
other Cabinet officials.
11. See Caroline Faraj, King Begins 'Historic' Visit to Syria Today (Apr. 21, 1999)
< http://www.jordanembassyus.org/042199001.htm>.
12. See Lany Deifner, Where is Barak Headed?, JERUSALEM POST, May 20, 1999,
at lB.
13. See Marilyn Henry, UN to Vote on PLO Bid to Denounce Israel, JERUSALEM
POST, Feb. 7, 1999, at 4.
14. See generally Sarah Honing, Winning the World's Love, JERUSALEM POST,
June 11, 1999, at 8B.
15. See Danna Harman, Arafat to Give Barak Reply on Wye in 2 Weeks,
JERUSALEM POST, July 28, 1999, at 1.
16. See discussion infra note 19.
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1999.17 Two further events, the signing of the September 4, 1999
Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of
Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the
Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations ("Sharm" or "Sharm
Memorandum") and the July 2000 summit at Camp David will be
analyzed and discussed, considering their prospects for overcoming
the challenges left unmet by the WRM. Newly apparent obstacles
that impede the ability to compromise will be evaluated in order to
accurately depict the prospects for the current Middle East peace
process. Part I examines the inception of the WRM and its position
in the peace process, considers the terms of the Memorandum, and
compares it to previous interim agreements. An analysis of the
United States' expanded role, as defined by the WRM, is also
included in Part I of this Article. Part II discusses the problems that
have arisen since the signing of the Memorandum involving doubts
fostered by each side, the difficult issue of gauging Palestinian
compliance, and the repercussions that will affect the Jewish
"settlements." Part III of this Article focuses on the end of the
interim period. Part IV examines the Sharm Memorandum and new
prospects for the peace process and permanent status issues. The
Camp David II summit will also be discussed as it provides greater
insight into the future of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The author
concludes this Article by reviewing public opinion concerning the
implementation of negotiated agreements and evaluating the viability
of peace. The recent unrest, which has become known as the Al-
Aqsa Intifada, is considered in a Postscript.
I. Inception of the Wye River Memorandum
A. The Memorandum's Position in the Peace Process
In order to fully appreciate the political and legal significance of
the WRM, this document must be placed in its proper historical
context. According to the Memorandum's preamble, its purpose is
"to facilitate implementation of the Interim Agreement [Oslo II] on
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ... and other related
agreements... so that the Israeli and Palestinian sides can more
effectively carry out their reciprocal responsibilities, including those
17. See A Full Peace, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1999, at 8.
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relating to further redeployments and security."'8  This statement
emphasizes the fact that the WRM is not an independent document
but, rather, a segment of the larger Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
To date, the parties have concluded eight transitional agreements.
Five of these agreements, the Declaration of Principals ("DOP"),
signed on September 13, 1993); the Oslo II Agreement, signed on
September 28, 1995; the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in
Hebron and Related Documents ("Hebron Protocol"), signed on
January 17, 1997; the subject of this review, the WRM, signed on
October 23, 1998; and the Sharm Memorandum, signed on November
4, 1999, remain relevant as the other three have been superseded." In
18. Wye River Memorandum, Oct. 23, 1998, Isr.-PLO, 37 I.L.M. 1251 (1998), in
INFORMATION DIVISION, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, STATE OF ISRAEL, THE
WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, at 5 [hereinafter WRM].
19. Eight transitional agreements have been concluded between Israel and the
Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO"). The first was the Declaration of
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. Declaration of Principles on
Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-PLO, 32 I.L.M. 1525
(1993) in INFORMATION DIVISION, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, STATE OF ISRAEL,
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS
[hereinafter DOP]. The Israel-PLO Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Greater
Jericho Area was the second agreement; it provides for the partial redeployment of
Israeli administration and military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and
allows the PA to assume most functions of local governance in those areas.
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1999, Isr.-PLO, 33 I.L.M.
622 (1994) in INFORMATION DIVISION, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, STATE OF
ISRAEL, AGREEMENT ON THE GAZA STRIP AND THE JERICHO AREA [hereinafter Cairo
Agreement]. The third agreement allows for the transfer of authority to the PA in
certain limited spheres, such as health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism,
education, and culture in the parts of the West Bank outside of the Jericho area.
Agreement on Preparatory Powers and Responsibilities, Aug. 29, 1994, Israel-PLO,
34 I.L.M. 455 (1995), in INFORMATION DIVISION, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
STATE OF ISRAEL, AGREEMENT ON PREPARATORY POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
[hereinafter Eretz Agreement]. The fourth agreement, the Protocol on Transfer of
Powers and Responsibilities, transfers powers in the West Bank to the PA in the
following civil spheres: labor, industry and commerce, gas, petroleum, agriculture,
local government, statistics and postal services. Protocol on Transfer of Powers, Aug.
27, 1995, Isr.-PLO, in INFORMATION DIVISION, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
STATE OF ISRAEL, PROTOCOL ON TRANSFER OF POWERS [hereinafter Transfer
Agreement]. The fifth agreement, generally referred to as the Interim Agreement or
Oslo II, was concluded between the parties on September 28, 1995. Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995,
Isr.-PLO, in MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, STATE OF ISRAEL, ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP
[hereinafter Oslo II]. It comprehensively structures the Israeli-PA relationship for
the duration of the interim period. Id. The Hebron Protocol was the sixth interim
agreement. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron and Related
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this context, the WRM was critical for tackling the intractable
impasse, which overshadowed the Oslo process for nineteen months.
Although the primary focus of this Article is legal analysis of the
WRM, it is also necessary to address the political significance of this
document. The WRM marks the first time a Likud (Israeli right of
center political party) government has initiated, negotiated and
signed an agreement to withdraw from and transfer West Bank areas
to the PA, which were historically part of the Biblical patrimony of
the Jewish people. Many observers have argued, therefore, that the
WRM symbolizes the abandonment of the Israeli right-wing's
traditional dream to reside in eretz yisrael hashlama, which roughly
translates to "the entire territory promised by God to the Jews for
eternity."'2 In addition, the WRM has been instrumental in forging a
closer relationship between the Palestinian and American
leaderships." This new rapport was epitomized by Clinton's
unprecedented subsequent visit to the Palestinian-controlled area of
Gaza in fulfillment of his WRM conmitments.' The WRM gave new
political life to the moribund Middle East peace process and, at least
for a period, restored hope to the region.
Documents, Jan. 17, 1997, Isr.-PLO, 36 I.L.M. 650 (1997), in MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, STATE OF ISRAEL, PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE REDEPLOYMENT IN
HEBRON AND RELATED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter Hebron Protocol or Protocol]. The
seventh agreement is the Wye River Memorandum, the subject of this review.
WRM, supra note 18. The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation
Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption
of Permanent Status Negotiations of September 4, 1999, is the eighth. Sharm el-
Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of
Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, Sept. 4,
1999, Isr.-PLO, in MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, STATE OF ISRAEL, SHARM EL-
SHEIKH MEMORANDUM ON IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE OF OUTSTANDING
COMMITMENTS OF AGREEMENTS SIGNED AND THE RESUMPTION OF PERMANENT
STATUS NEGOTIATIONS [hereinafter Sharm or Sharm Memorandum.]
20. Several Palestinian journalists have noted that Likud's commitment to
withdraw troops from the West Bank, or Judea and Samaria, reverses its right wing's
historic claims that these areas are an inherent part of Eretz Yisrael (i.e., the notion
of "greater Israel"). See, e.g., Abdel-Azim Hammad, Giving It 100 Percent, AL-
AHRAM, Nov. 4,1998, FBIS-NES-98-312, at 11.
21. As one observer has noted, as a result of the Wye negotiations, "Arafat may
have won himself an ally upon whom he can depend in the White House." Hammad,
supra note 20.
22. It should be noted that many Israelis bemoaned Clinton's visit since it
diminished the "special" United States-Israeli relationship. See Hillel Kuttner, A
Warmth That Can Be Felt, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 26,1999, at 17.
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B. The Terms Agreed Upon
1. The Wye River Memorandum and Related Letters from the
United States
The Israeli Foreign Ministry's published version of the WRM is
thirteen pages in length and consists of two parts: the text and the
timetable, or timeline. The text of the Memorandum is divided into
five articles. Article I, "Further Redeployments," states that Israel
must redeploy from 13% of the West Bank. 3 Article II, "Security," is
the longest section of the Memorandum and outlines specific
"responsibilities for security" that the PA must assume in order to
prevent future terrorist attacks against Israel.4 Article III, "Interim
Committees and Economic Issues," reactivates several bilateral
committees, acknowledges the commitment to the construction and
operation of the Port of Gaza,' concludes a "Protocol Regarding the
Establishment and Operation of the International Airport in the
Gaza Strip During the Interim Period,"26 and resumes negotiations on
the "Safe Passage," a road between Gaza and the West BankY It
also requires the Palestinian Authority to provide a copy of all of its
23. WRM, supra note 18, art. I(A)(1), at 5. One percent of this territory will be
transferred to Area A, territory under complete Palestinian control, and the
remaining 12% will be transferred to Area B, territory under joint Palestinian and
Israeli control. See id. After these transfers, the PA will have day-to-day control of
approximately 40% of the West Bank. See William J. Clinton, Statements at the
Signing of the Wye River Memorandum, in WRM, supra note 18, at 22. Area C will
remain under both Israeli military and civil control. See Margot Dudkevitch, Settlers
Highlight Illegal Palestinian Building in Gush Etzion, JERUSALEM PosT, Nov. 23,
1999, at 4. The WRM also designated 3% of Area B as a Nature Reserve, which falls
under Israeli jurisdiction. WRM, supra note 18, art. I(A)(1), at 5. Ninety-nine
percent of the Palestinian population lives under areas A and B. See Binyamin
Netanyahu, The First Year-Last Time, JERUSALEM POST, May 19,2000, at A8.
24. WRM, supra note 18, art. II, at 6-9. The PA has agreed to outlaw and combat
terrorist organizations, to prohibit illegal weapons, to prevent incitement to violence
or terror, to conduct bilateral security cooperation with Israel, to provide a list of
Palestinian policemen to Israel, and to "reaffirm" the PLO's commitment to amend
the Palestinian National Charter. See id. Article II also addresses the PA's
commitment to respond to "requests for arrest and transfer of suspects and
defendants" and to abide by "internationally accepted norms of human rights" in the
areas under their control. Id. art. II(C)(3)-(4), at 9. Article II also states that the PA
must provide a list of their policemen to the Israelis and "reaffirm" the nullification
of the PLO Charter. Id. art. II(C)(1)-(2).
25. Id. art. 111(4), at 10.
26. Id. art. 111(2), at 9-10.
27. Id. art. 111(3), at 10.
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current laws to the Israelis 3  Article IV, "Permanent Status
Negotiations," states that the parties will "immediately resume
permanent status negotiations" in order to reach an agreement by
May 4, 1999.29 The final article, Article V, "Unilateral Actions,"
declares that "neither side shall initiate or take any step that will
change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. '
The second part of the WRM, the "Time Line," is "an integral
attachment to the agreement" that provides a time frame for the
implementation of each step of the agreement.3 This is a new
characteristic in the peace agreements, which will be examined in the
next section of this Article. Although the WRM officially ends with
the timetable, the booklet published by the Israeli Foreign Ministry
includes five letters of assurance written by senior U.S. officials to the
Israeli government. One of these letters was written by U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, one by Special Middle East
Coordinator Dennis B. Ross, and three by U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Edward S. Walker, Jr.33 These letters were meant to clarify or
confirm the United States' official position on ambiguous aspects of
the WRM.M They also demonstrated a heightened U.S. involvement
in the peace process.
2. The Intricate "Time Line"
The purpose of the timeline was to structure chronologically the
implementation of each step of the agreement. This concept is not
entirely novel but extends the notion of reciprocity, which previously
appeared in the Hebron Protocol. Reciprocity, however, was deemed
too vague a concept to be accurately judged and bilaterally agreed
upon, and thus the timeline was introduced to provide the Israeli
28. Id. art. 111(5), at 10. Article III also requires that the Israeli government
allow the opening of the Gaza Industrial Estate. Id. art. 111(2), at 9-10. In addition,
both sides agree to reopen economic dialogue and to "jointly approach the donor
community to organize a Ministerial Conference... to seek pledges for enhanced
levels of assistance." Id. art. III(6)-(7), at 10.
29. Id. art. IV, at 10-11.
30. Id. art. V, at 11.
31. Id., Time Line at 12.
32. Statements at the Signing of the Wye River Memorandum, in WRM, supra
note 18, at 14-18.
33. Id.
34. U.S. Letters of Assurance to Israel, Oct. 29-30, 1998, in WRM, supra note 18,
at 15-18.
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government and the PA with a system of checks and balances and to
foster trust where it had been severely lacking. Essentially, the
timeline allows each side to tangibly assess whether the other is
incrementally fulfilling its part of the agreement. The United States'
position is explained in a letter from Secretary of State Albright to
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu: "We [the United States] believe its
parallel phased approach will help provide greater confidence to both
sides in the implementation process, since actions in each stage of the
time line are to be completed by both sides before moving on to the
next stage."35
The timeline was strategically designed to ensure that the PA
fulfilled its obligations before the Israeli government moved forward
to meet its further commitments. The timeline was structured in this
fashion because the PA has had ongoing obligations (e.g., combating
terrorism, reducing the number of active policemen, and collecting
weapons) which are more difficult to monitor and assess.' By
contrast, the Israeli government has had "one-shot" obligations, such
as transferring land to the PA,37 an action which, while easy to verify,
would be politically and militarily difficult to reverse.
Although the notion of reciprocity or "parallelism" should
theoretically benefit the peace process, it is equally prone to
hampering it. The timetable has served as an excuse for regular
breakdowns in the peace process because either side could halt the
implementation of its commitments anytime it was unsatisfied with
the way the other was fulfilling its commitments. For example, the
government of Prime Minister Netanyahu and the PA reached an
impasse in the implementation of obligations listed under Week 2-603
This third stage of implementation required the Palestinian Central
Council ("PCC") to reaffirm Arafat's January 22, 1998 letter to
Clinton "concerning the nullification Palestinian National Charter
provisions that are inconsistent with the letters exchanged between
35. Letter from Madeline K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, to Binyamin
Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel (Oct. 23, 1998), in WRM, supra note 18, at 14.
36. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Wye River Memorandum, October
23, 1998. An Analysis (visited Nov. 29, 2000) <http://www.israel.org/
mfa/go.asp?MFAH07oj O>.
37. See id.
38. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wye River Memorandum: Status of
Implementation as of April 1999 (visited Nov. 29, 2000) <http://www.israel.org/
mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ef90>.
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the PLO and the Government of Israel on 9/10 September 1993."' 9
On December 14, 1998, the Palestinian National Council ("PNC")
voted by an overwhelming majority to revoke sections of the
Palestinian Covenant calling for Israel's destruction. In spite of this
historic vote, however, Netanyahu's government claimed that the PA
had violated too many other aspects of the WRM for Israel to be
obligated to proceed with its parallel commitment." Netanyahu
stated that Israel would not proceed with the second stage of
redeployment until Arafat "'official[ly] and unequivocal[ly]"'
renounced his plan to declare a Palestinian state on May 4, 1999, and
the PA terminated its incitement of violence and restored security
cooperation with Israel 2 In addition, Netanyahu stated that Israel
would not conduct the redeployment until the PA also confiscated
illegal weapons and reduced the size of its police force.43 Since these
terms had not been met by December 18, 1998, Israel did not conduct
the scheduled 5% transfer of territory and suspended the
implementation of the WRM.M
39. WRM, supra note 18, art. II(C)(2), at 9.
40. See Danna Harman, Netanyahu Praises Palestinian Vote, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 15, 1998, at 1. According to the precise wording of the WRM, the PNC did not
have to formally vote to revoke the Palestinian Covenant. However, under pressure
from Israel and the United States, Arafat convened the PNC to vote for the
cancellation of the sections of the Covenant that called for Israel's destruction. See
id. This dramatic event took place in Gaza as Clinton, the first American President
ever to visit the Palestinian autonomous areas, looked on. See id. Both Netanyahu
and Clinton praised the vote. See id.
41. See Danna Harman et al., PNC Vote Not Enough For Withdrawl, JERUSALEM
POST, Dec. 14,1998, at 1.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. The precise obligations of Week 2-6 were as follows:
-Palestinian Central Council reaffirms Charter letter (weeks two to four)
(II(C)(2))
-PNC and other PLO organizations reaffirm Charter letter (weeks four to
six) (II(C)(2))
-Establishment of weapons collection program (II(A)(2)(b)) and collection
stage (II(A)(2)(c)); committee starts and reports on activities.
-Anti-incitement committee report (II(A)(3)(b))
-Ad Hoc Economic Committee: interim report at week three; final report
at week six (III)
-Policemen list (II(C)(1)(a)); Monitoring and Steering Committee review
starts (II(C)(1)(c))
-Stage 2 of F.R.D. implementation: 5% C to B. Israeli officials acquaint
their Palestinian counterparts as required with areas; F.R.D. carried out;
report on F.R.D. implementation (I(A))
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C. Wye as Compared to Previous Interim Agreements
Although this Article has thus far analyzed the new aspects of
the WRM, it is also important to determine whether previously
introduced problems have been effectively addressed. This Section
will evaluate the changes (or lack thereof) in three high-profile areas:
the size and composition of the Palestinian police force, violations of
human rights, and the revocation of offensive provisions in the
Palestinian National Covenant.
The matter of the Palestinian police force is rooted in the first
Israeli-PLO agreement. Article VIII of the DOP vaguely states, "In
order to guarantee public order and internal security for the
Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will
establish a strong police force."45 The subject is clarified by Annex I,
Article IV(3)(a) of the Oslo II Agreement:
During the interim period, the total number of policemen of the
Palestinian Police in all its branches in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip will be no more than 30,000 out of which up to 12,000
policemen may be deployed in the West Bank and up to 18,000
policemen in the Gaza Strip. These numbers may be changed by
agreement, if necessary. The Palestinian side will notify Israel of
the names of the policemen recruited to the Palestinian Police in
the Gaza Strip. 6
The WRM loosened Oslo II's stringent language. Instead of
insisting that the Palestinian police force be reduced from more than
41,000, its actual figure, to 30,000, the Memorandum simply required
that "[t]he Palestinian side ... provide a list of its policemen to the
Israeli side in conformity with the prior agreements.,
47
In the wake of criticism directed at Netanyahu for "skirting
around the subject" of Palestinian police force numbers, Nabil Sha'th,
the Palestinian Minister of Planning and International Cooperation,
acknowledged that "the Palestinian police now number 36,000" but
added that there are "really only weapons for 24,000." 4  The
WRM, supra note 18, Time Line § 3, at 12-13.
45. DOP, supra note 19, art. VIII, at 25.
46. Oslo II, supra note 19, Annex I, art. IV(3)(a), at 40.
47. WRM, supra note 18, art. II(C)(1)(a), at 8.
48. Egypt: PA's Sha'th on Wye Accord, Statehood, JERUSALEM PosT, Nov. 9,
1998, at 3.
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remaining force was doing "various administrative work."49 He stated
that the Palestinian side would circumvent the 30,000 limitation by
only submitting a list of its armed policemen to the Israeis 0 If the
PA carried out this plan, they would be in clear violation of the Oslo
II agreement. Netanyahu should have insisted, and his successor
Barak should clearly insist, on explicit language and compliance with
this provision, thus limiting the Palestinian police force to 30,000.
The issue of human rights was also largely overlooked or
intentionally neglected in the WRM. Instead of including more
specific language or detailed expectations, Article II(C)(4) of the
Memorandum copies verbatim the core of the Oslo II Agreement's
section on the same subject. Article XI(1) of Annex I of the Oslo II
Agreement states,
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Palestinian
Police and the Israeli military forces shall exercise their powers and
responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement with due regard to
internationally-accepted norms of human rights and the rule of law,
and shall be guided by the need to protect the public, respect
human dignity and avoid harassment.5'
The WRM failed to address specific human rights violations in the
region or to delineate new guidelines for the protection and
enforcement of human rights.
As with the section on human rights, the WRM did not
substantially differ from previous agreements on the issue of the
Palestinian Covenant. Arafat initiated the subject of amending the
Covenant on September 9, 1993, before the DOP was signed.' In a
letter written to Yitzhak Rabin, Arafat declared that the PLO would
recognize the right of Israel to live in peace and security, and would
be committed to a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. 3 "Consequently," Arafat wrote, "the PLO undertakes to
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. Oslo II, supra note 19, Annex I, art. XI (1), at 64.
52. See Letter from Yasser Arafat, Chairman, PLO, to Yitzhak Rabin, Prime
Minister of Israel (Sept. 9, 1993), in DOP, supra note 19, at 38.
53. See DOP supra note 19. According to Article 33 of the Covenant, however,
changing the text would require two-thirds of the National Council of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization to vote in favor of an amendment. The text of the
Palestinian Covenant may be found in THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT, VOL. III:
DOCUMENTS (John Norton Moore ed., 1974), at 706.
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submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the
necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant."' The Oslo
II Agreement reiterates this commitment, adding only that the PLO
should undertake this step "within two months of the date of the
inauguration of the Council."55
The WRM changed the wording of this obligation. Article
II(C)(2) states,
The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation
Organization and the Palestinian Central Council will reaffirm the
letter of 22 January 1998 from PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to
President Clinton concerning the nullification of the Palestinian
National Charter provisions that are inconsistent with the letters
exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel on 9/10
September 1993."
According to this statement, then, the Palestinian National Council
did not legally have to vote to amend the Charter, they just had to
reaffirm a letter concerning it. Nonetheless, Israel pushed for a
formal vote to take place." Knesset member Natan Sharansky
eloquently explained why Israel was so adamant about the PLO's full
and public annulment of the Covenant:
If Arafat and the Palestinian leadership were taking other steps
that mark the transformation from war to peace, the covenant
might truly be a "piece of paper." Whether by inculcating the value
of peace in their children's educational curricula and TV programs,
championing peace in Arabic speeches on Palestinian TV, or
publicly denouncing extremism, there are countless ways to
promote reconciliation. But so far, we have witnessed only the
opposite.
As it now stands, demanding that the Palestinians fulfill their
obligation to change their covenant is the only instrument that
Israel has to insist that the Palestinian people begin a genuine
54. Letter from Yasser Arafat, supra note 52.
55. Oslo II, supra note 19, art. XXXI (9), at 28.
56. WRM, supra note 18, art. II(C)(2), at 9.
57. In a television interview, Ilana Dayan posed the following question to
Netanyahu: "And are you saying today that if the Palestinian Charter is not
abrogated by the PNC by means of a legal voting procedure, Israel will not redeploy
from the territories it has pledged to redeploy from in the framework of the Wye
Memorandum?" Netanyahu on Iraq Crisis, Wye Accord, FBIS-NES-98-317, Nov. 13,
1998, at 4. Netanyahu answered, "That is correct." Id.
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transformation [and embrace peace]."'
On December 14, 1998, Clinton watched as an overwhelming
majority of the PNC stood up and raised their hands in favor of
amending the Covenant." Although the results of this vote were not
formally tallied, Netanyahu deemed the process and its outcome
satisfactory, and the issue was laid to rest. °
The WRM includes the most detailed section on security of any
PLO-Israeli agreement to date. Security has become such a
significant element of the peace process that political commentators
mocked Netanyahu for effectively changing Israel's negotiating
strategy from "land for peace" to "land for security." It is important
to thoroughly examine the WRM's new security provisions in order to
understand how they differ from the previous six interim agreements
and to evaluate whether these changes will be effective.
The DOP's references to security matters were brief, vague, and
relatively balanced. The Preamble states, "The Government of the
State of Israel and the P.L.O. team.., agree that it is time to...
strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and
security."'" While striving for this ideal, Israel deemed it necessary to
retain overriding responsibility for security while realizing the
Palestinian need to secure its new autonomous areas. Article VIII,
"Public Order and Security," reflected this policy:
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the
Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will
establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry
the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as
the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of
safeguarding their internal security and public order. 2
Considering the historic magnitude of the DOP, the use of such
general language is quite surprising. The PA is not expressly held
58. Natan Sharansky, Not a Technicality, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 7,1998, at 10.
59. See Harman, supra note 40.
60. See id.
61. DOP, supra note 19, at 21.
62. DOP, supra note 19, art.VIII, at 25. There was only one other reference to
the issue of security in the DOP, which was in Annex II of the Agreed Minutes. I&,
Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements, Annex II, at 37. It stated, "It is understood that, subsequent to the
Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for
internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis." Id.
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responsible for preventing terrorists coming from the autonomous
areas or for preventing incitement to violence.
By the time the Oslo II Agreement was signed in September
1995, however, the issue of terrorism had become for Israelis the
litmus test in the peace process. One hundred thirty-seven Jews had
been murdered in Israel by April 199563 in more than thirty terrorist
attacks carried out since the peace process began." These devastating
attacks propelled the issue of security to the forefront of the
Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. The language and content of the Oslo II
Agreement's sections on security reflected Israel's heightened
concern about terrorist attacks as well as the PA's failure to curtail
terrorist organizations. Article XIII, "Security," reiterated the
general security formula devised in the DOP but included a new
ingredient: the mention of terrorism.65 The article states, "Israel shall
have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of
protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism."66
The Oslo II Agreement also differed from the DOP by including
a special section in Article XXII to address the problem of incitement
to violence:
Israel and the Council shall seek to foster mutual understanding
and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement,
including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without
derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take
legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations,
groups or individuals within their jurisdiction. 7
This new theme was included in the Oslo II Agreement because of
growing awareness that the PA did not deter but actually encouraged
hateful statements against Israel.
Although in language and content the Oslo II Agreement is
more detailed and extensive than the DOP, the overall tone of Oslo
II is neutral. The emphasis on bilateral responsibility was
demonstrated by the use of phrases such as "both sides" or "each
63. See Meir Indor, Alisa's Last Journey, and Beyond, JERUSALEM POST, April
20, 1995, at 5.
64. See Previous Attacks with Casualties on or near Buses Since the Signing of the
Oslo Accords, JERUSALEM POST, July 25, 1995, at 4; see also Recent Deadly Terrorist
Incidents, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 22, 1995, at 4.
65. Oslo II, supra note 19, art. XIII, at 16.
66. Id. art. XIII(2)(a), at 16.
67. Id. art. XXII (1), at 24.
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side" in reference to future efforts to combat violence and terrorism.'
In addition to impartiality, the Oslo II Agreement explicitly showed
the parties striving to "put an end to decades of confrontation and to
live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, while
recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights."69
The Hebron Protocol did not include any new sections on
security. Article 2, "Security Powers and Responsibilities," merely
stated that "both sides reaffirm their commitment to honor the
relevant security provisions of the [Oslo II] Agreement."'7 Although
the Protocol did specifically address the security of Hebron, the only
other references to general security measures were presented in the
Note for the Record." According to the Note for the Record, the
Palestinian side had to reaffirm its commitment to "[flighting terror
and preventing violence[,] ... [p]reventing incitement and hostile
propaganda[,] ... [c]ombat[ing] systematically and effectively
terrorist organizations and infrastructure, [and] apprehend[ing],
prosecut[ing] and punish[ing] ... terrorists."72 This statement did not
add any new components to the Palestinian or Israeli responsibilities
on the issue of terrorism. In fact, it virtually copied Section 3 of the
Oslo II Agreement's Annex I, Article II, "Security Policy for the
Prevention of Terrorism and Violence.""'
68. E.g., id. art. XV, at 18; Annex I, art. II, at 33.
69. Id., Preamble, at 6.
70. Hebron Protocol, supra note 19, art. 2(b), at 5.
71. Id., Note for the Record, at 17-19. The Note for the Record is three pages in
length and contains a summary of the agreements reached by Arafat and Netanyahu
during a meeting on January 15, 1997, in the presence of Ambassador Dennis Ross.
Id.; see also Justus R. Weiner, The Hebron Protocol: The End of the Beginning or the
Beginning of the End of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process?, 15 B.U. INT'L LJ. 373,
388-89 (1997).
72. Hebron Protocol, supra note 19, Note for the Record, at 18-19.
73. Oslo II, supra note 19, Annex I, art. 11(3), at 33-34. Section 3 states,
With a view to implementing the above, each side shall, in accordance
with the provisions of this Agreement, carry out the following functions in
the areas under its security responsibility:
a. protect all residents of, and all other persons present in, these areas;
b. actively prevent incitement to violence, including violence against the
other side or persons under the authority of the other side;
c. apprehend, investigate and prosecute perpetrators and all other
persons directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism, violence and
incitement; and
d. prevent and deal with any attempt to cause damage or harm to
infrastructure serving the other side, including, inter alia, roads, water,
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In contrast to all of the interim agreements, including the
Hebron Protocol, the WRM radically extends the Palestinian side's
obligation to curtail terrorism and violence against Israel. The
Memorandum requires the PA to take five specific steps in order to
outlaw and combat terrorist organizations,74 three specific steps to
handle illegal weapons,75 two specific steps to prevent incitement,76
electricity, telecommunications and sewage infrastructure.
Id.
74. WRM, supra note 18, art. II(A)(1), at 6-7. The full text of Article
II(A)(1), "Outlawing and Combating Terrorist Organizations," states,
(a) The Palestinian side will make known its policy of zero tolerance for
terror and violence against both sides.
(b) A work plan developed by the Palestinian side will be shared with the
U.S. and thereafter implementation will begin immediately to ensure the
systematic and effective combat of terrorist organizations and their
infrastructure.
(c) In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a
U.S.-Palestinian committee will meet biweekly to review the steps being
taken to eliminate terrorist cells and the support structure that plans,
finances, supplies and abets terror. In these meetings, the Palestinian side
will inform the U.S. fully of the actions it has taken to outlaw all
organizations (or wings of organizations, as appropriate) of a military,
terrorist or violent character and their support structure and to prevent them
from operating in the areas under its jurisdiction.
(d) The Palestinian side will apprehend the specific individuals suspected of
perpetrating acts of violence and terror for the purpose of further
investigation, and prosecution and punishment of all persons involved in acts
of violence and terror.
(e) A U.S.-Palestinian committee will meet to review and evaluate
information pertinent to the decisions on prosecution, punishment or other
legal measures which affect the status of individuals suspected of abetting or
perpetrating acts of violence and terror.
Id.
75. Id. art. II(A)(2), at 7. The text of Article II(A)(2), "Prohibiting Illegal
Weapons," states,
(a) The Palestinian side will ensure an effective legal framework is in place
to criminalize, in conformity with the prior agreements, any importation,
manufacturing or unlicensed sale, acquisition or possession of firearms,
ammunition or weapons in areas under Palestinian jurisdiction.
(b) In addition, the Palestinian side will establish and vigorously and
continuously implement a systematic program for the collection and
appropriate handling of all such illegal items in accordance with the prior
agreements. The U.S. has agreed to assist in carrying out this program.
(c) A U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee will be established to assist and
enhance cooperation in preventing the smuggling or other unauthorized
introduction of weapons or explosive materials into areas under Palestinian
jurisdiction.
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and to comply with several additional sections that address different
aspects of security. Article II(A)(1)(c) effectively illustrates the
WRM's more specific and detailed treatment of security matters:
In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security
cooperation, a U.S.-Palestinian committee will meet biweekly to
review the steps being taken to eliminate terrorist cells and the
support structure that plans, finances, supplies and abets terror. In
these meetings, the Palestinian side will inform the U.S. fully of the
actions it has taken to outlaw all organizations (or wings of
organizations, as appropriate) of a military, terrorist or violent
character and their support structure and to prevent them from
operating in the areas under its jurisdiction.?
In departure from past agreements, the WRM does not simply
state that the PA must "fight terror and violence," but gives a
detailed description of what particular steps the PA should take to
combat and eliminate terrorism.78
The WRM's major restructuring of security issues has generated
substantial commentary from the involved parties. The new security
aspect of the WRM was so significant to the Israeli team that
Netanyahu explicated its importance at the signing ceremony:
We are more secure today because, for the first time since the
signing of the Oslo accords, we will see concrete and verifiable
commitments carried out. Our Palestinian partners will join us in
fighting terrorism. They will follow a detailed and systematic plan
to fight terrorists and their infrastructure, to jail killers that have so
far roamed at large, to stop vitriolic incitement, and, above all,
76. Id. art. II(A)(3), at 7-8. Article II(A)(3), "Preventing Incitement," states,
(a) Drawing on relevant international practice and pursuant to Article XXII
(1) of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the Record, the Palestinian
side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or
terror, and establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all
expressions or threats of violence or terror. This decree will be comparable
to the existing Israeli legislation which deals with the same subject.
(b) A U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet on a regular basis to
monitor cases of possible incitement to violence or terror and to make
recommendations and reports on how to prevent such incitement. The
Israeli, Palestinian and U.S. sides will each appoint a media specialist, a law
enforcement representative, an educational specialist and a current or
former elected official to the committee.
Id.
77. Id. art. II(A)(1)(c), at 6-7.
78. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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finally after 35 years, to cancel the articles in the Palestinian
Charter which call for the destruction of Israel. This means that
our world today will be safer for our children and for our
neighbors' children.79
Some Palestinians also praised the security provisions, but for
different reasons. Dr. Nabil Sha'th, Palestinian Minister of Planning
and International Cooperation, argued, for example, that the
Palestinians stood firm during tough security negotiations and were
pleased with the results obtained. He explained that the security
aspects of the WRM
are based on a security plan drafted by the Palestinian side. The
Palestinian side will then inform the U.S. side of this plan to enable
the Americans to assess the results of its enforcement in the future.
The Israeli side wanted the accord to specify a security plan, but
80this did not happen.
In the Egyptian daily Al-Ahram, Abdel-Azim Hammad also
argued that the PA did well in the bargaining sessions. He stated that
the WRM affirmed that "Arafat is expected to commit himself 100
percent to the fight against terrorism; but he is not expected to
guarantee 100 percent results. '8'  This understanding appears to
excuse in advance the Palestinian failure to curb terrorism.
Other Palestinians, however, were critical of the new security
arrangements. A common view was expressed by Salama A. Salama:
The Wye Accord will not only restrict the movement of the
Palestinians and make Arafat and his National Authority hostages
to harsh security considerations; it will not even permit the
Palestinian opposition to make a sound. In contrast, the Israeli
opposition is not prevented by the security agencies from
demonstrating or resorting to violence.8
Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmad Yasin articulated a similar
sentiment. He claimed, "They say that this [peace process] is about
Israel's security interests, but in fact Yasser Arafat and his
intelligence services are only to make sure that the resistance against
79. Benjamin Netanyahu, Statements at the Signing of the Wye River
Memorandum, in WRM, supra note 18, at 25.
80. Egypt: PA's Sha'th on Wye Accord, Statehood, supra note 48.
81. Hammad, supra note 20.
82. Salama A. Salama, AL AHRAM, Nov. 4, 1998, at 11.
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the Israeli occupiers ends."'
Perhaps Milt Bearden, the former Directorate of Operations for
the CIA, can be credited with having made the most accurate, if not
pragmatic, observation about the security provisions. He said that the
WRM "is neither a great deal nor a particularly bad one. It is the first
time that PA Chairman Yasser Arafat has put his signature to a
document on key security issues, and that precedent must be viewed
positively."84  Realistically, Arafat's endorsement cannot be
considered a major stride toward peace. Shortly after signing the
DOP, which he called "the best possible agreement in the worst
possible circumstances," Arafat subsequently referred to the
agreement as the "first step 'in the 1974 plan'-known by Arabs as
the 'plan of phases' for the destruction of Israel. '
The Memorandum, along with the six earlier Israeli-PLO
transitional agreements, was the product of intense political
negotiations. By virtue of this fact, each of the agreements includes
some sections that are less favorable to Israel but more favorable to
the Palestinians, and vice versa. Clearly, each party must yield on
certain issues in order to get its way on other ones.
D. The United States' Expanded Role
1. The United States as "Peace Broker"
Initially, the United States played a very limited role in the
Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Although the White House served
as the "master of ceremonies ' 6 during the September 1993 signing of
the DOP, the Oslo negotiations were primarily bilateral, involving
Israeli and Palestinian delegates with occasional intervention from
their Norwegian hosts. Approximately four years later, with the
signing of the Hebron Protocol, the United States emerged not only
as an important broker of peace, but as the sole mediator of the peace
83. West Bank and Gaza Strip: Shaykh Yasin Says Peace Process 'Has Definitely
Failed,' FBIS-NES-98-300, Oct. 27, 1998, at 1 (interview with Hamas leader Shaykh
Ahmad Yasin).
84. Milt Bearden, CIA as Honest Broker, JERUSALEM PosT, Nov. 11, 1998, at 8.
85. Justus R. Weiner, Hard Facts Meet Soft Law-The Israeli-PLO Declaration
of Principles and the Prospects for Peace: A Response to Katherine W. Meighan, 35
VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 967 (1995).
86. Weiner, supra note 71, at 398.
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process.' The WRM augmented the United States' dominant
position in the peace process by giving the third party a crucial role in
the implementation of the agreement.
The United States' expanded role in the WRM is evidenced by
the unprecedented establishment of two bilateral U.S.-Palestinian
committees and three trilateral U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian committees,
designed to oversee and enforce Palestinian efforts to combat
terrorism.' More specifically, one of the bilateral committees was
established "to review the steps being taken to eliminate terrorist
cells,"'89 while the other was created "to review and evaluate
information... which affect[s] the status of individuals suspected of
abetting or perpetrating acts of violence and terror." 9 The trilateral
committees were aimed at implementing other aspects of the
Palestinian security commitments.9'
The WRM also gave the United States the critical push to
supervise the implementation of commitments that fall outside of the
bi- and tri-lateral committees' jurisdiction. For example, the
Palestinians must provide the United States with a precise "work
plan.., to ensure the systematic and effective combat of terrorist
organizations and their infrastructure,"'  and provide the United
States with biweekly briefings of their progress on this front.' The
Monitoring and Steering Committee will also provide regular
briefings to the United States on their efforts to compile a list of
Palestinian policemen.9' It is important to note that although the
Central Intelligence Agency is never explicitly mentioned in the
WRM, the United States' work in the region will be carried out under
the auspices of the CIA.9 The Agency's purpose is to help counter
87. See id.
88. See Arieh O'Sullivan, Calling in the CIA, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 30, 1998, at
14.
89. WRM, supra note 18, art. II(A)(1)(c), at 6.
90. Id. art. II(A)(1)(d), at 7.
91. See id. art. II(A)(2)(c), at 7; art. II(A)(3)(b), at 7; art. II(B)(3), at 8.
92. Id. art. II(A)(1)(b), at 6
93. Id. art. II(A)(1)(c), at 6-7; see also id. art. II(A)(1)(e), at 7.
94. See id. art. II(C)(1)(c), at 8. It should be noted that the Monitoring and
Steering Committee is one of the most senior committees which was created in Oslo
II. See Oslo II, supra note 19, art. XXVI, at 25.
95. See Nasir Yasin, West Bank and Gaza Strip: Role of the CIA in Palestinian-
Israeli Accord, AL-QUDS AL-ARABI (LONDON), FBIS-NES-98-301, Oct. 28,2000.
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terrorism and provide security-related intelligence.96 Since the United
States' role in the region is explicitly linked to these two issues, it is
fitting that the United States assumes a degree of responsibility
concerning supervision of the WRM. However, the CIA will not just
decide whether the Palestinians are sufficiently implementing their
responsibilities, but in addition will report back to the administration
officials in the United States.
Beyond providing legal and security cooperation, the United
States has committed itself to providing considerable financial
support for the peace process. (It should be noted that this was not
part of the text of the Memorandum but is a by-product of the
agreement.) The United States has pledged $1.2 billion over five
years to help defray the cost of Israeli redeployment and $400 million
to boost the Palestinian economy.' The latter contribution came on
November 30, 1998 at an international donor's conference during
which approximately $3.2 billion was pledged for various Palestinian
economic projects.'
There has been considerable review and analysis of the enhanced
U.S. role by various Israeli journalists and military and political
leaders. Some view this U.S. expansion as a gain for Israel, regarding
U.S. involvement as a means of guaranteeing that the PA will fulfill
its obligations. As one Israeli journalist has noted, Israel needs
"someone with influence" to ensure Arafat carries out his promises.'
96. See id.
97. See Hillel Kuttler, Redeployment Aid Agreement Near, JERUSALEM POST, Jan.
5, 1999, at 2; see also Debra DeLee, U.S. Must Make Good on Wye Vow, NEWSDAY
(NEW YORK), Nov. 3, 1999, at A47.
98. Delegates from over forty countries were present at the conference. See
Hillel Kuttler, Donor's Conference Raises $3.2b. for Palestinian Projects, JERUSALEM
POST, Dec. 2, 1998, at 2. The United States contributed $400 million to the
Palestinians, along with an additional $100 million in annual aid. See id. Thus, the
United States will contribute $900 million to the Palestinians over the next five years.
See id. Other major conference donations included $500 million by the European
Union, $200 million by Japan, and $170 million by Norway. See id. The funds are
supposed to be used for "job creation, improving education and access to clean water,
and strengthening law enforcement." Hillel Kuttler, US Pledges to Give Palestinians
$400m., JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 1, 1998, at 2. However, it is worthwhile to note that
approximately $20 million of European aid, which was meant to provide cheap
housing for Palestinians, was instead spent on luxury apartments for various
supporters of the PA in 1998. See Douglas Davis & Hillel Kuttler, Report: Arafat
Spent EU $20m. on Luxury Homes for PA Officials, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Nov.
30,1998, at 1.
99. Ron Ben-Yishai, A Good Agreement, Difficulties in Implementation, YEDIOT
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Gidon Ezra, former deputy head of the General Security Service
(known by the Hebrew initials "Shin Bet"), Israel's equivalent of the
FBI, likewise has stated, "'When we told the Palestinians to fight
terror, they didn't. There's a much better chance they'll listen to the
Americans.' "' An aide to former Israeli Defense Minister Yitzchak
Mordechai expressed a similar sentiment in an interview with The
Jerusalem Report:
"The Palestinian Authority is now an independent entity, and
treated as such by the world community. We can't treat them as
vassals and tell them how to run their security. But the Americans,
an invited outside power, can." Without an objective third party,
he sa[id], the Palestinians wouldn't do anything. "It's much better
for us to have Americans there than Frenchmen or Egyptians," he
argue[d]."'
Not all Israeli observers, however, are optimistic about the
expanded U.S. role. Some have complained, as it turns out with
justification, that the American involvement is undesirable as it
"prevents real dialogue and coexistence between us and the
Palestinians, and since it makes us even more dependent on the
United States."'" Others consider America's presence in the region a
political victory for the PA. As one observer has stated, "Arafat has
consistently advocated an international presence-such as U.N.
observers-in the territories in the transition phase from occupation
to statehood. Now he has what amounts to American observers.""
Former Shin Bet chief Carmi Gillon objected to the United States'
increased authority in the region for political reasons." He argued
that Palestinians could use the WRM to complain to the Americans
about every move that Israel makes, thereby straining American-
Israeli relations.105 "'The Palestinians have nothing to lose here. We
do,"' he argued °6 "'We cooperate with the Americans on things that
AHRONOT, Oct. 25, 1998, at A13, available at
<http://www.israel.orgmfa/go.asp?MFAHO7ntO>.
100. Leslie Susser, The New Partnership, JERUSALEM REPORT, Nov. 23, 1998, at
26.
101. Id.
102. Ben-Yishai, supra note 99.
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are really existential to us, like the Arrow anti-ballistic missile.
Bringing in the CIA is a major political blunder.""' 7
In addition to political concerns, security-related criticisms have
also been common in Israeli media. A former senior member of the
Mossad (Israeli intelligence agency, equivalent of the CIA) noted,
"'The CIA, and not Israel, will decide whether the Palestinians are
fulfilling their side of the bargain. The Americans, and not the
Palestinians, will be [Israel's] counterparts in arguments over security
defaults. They will either accept our complaints or dismiss them.""'
Another observer stated that the American involvement
"appears to break the long-standing Israeli protection of its security
interests by allowing foreigners to have a say in determining whether
its security is being harmed.""9 Former IDF intelligence director
General (retired) Shlomo Gazit concurred with this analysis, asserting
that the U.S.-Palestinian committees that were established by the
WRM were the "'worst items"' in the agreement."0 "'For the first
time in 50 years we have agreed that we shall be totally out of the
process of dealing with security problems,"' he argued."' He
continued, "'It's a horrible mistake and contrary to our long
experience.""'" Gazit cited Israeli-American experience during the
War of Attrition to prove his point. In August 1970, Israel had great
difficulty convincing America that Egypt had violated a cease-fire
agreement by moving SAM-3 missiles into the Suez Canal."1 "'The
Americans didn't want to know about it. They were afraid of having
to make a decision and we had enormous difficulties in convincing
them,"' Gazit declared, noting that this type of scenario could recur."'
It soon became clear that the tri-lateral aspect of the WRM
would not mean an end of conflict between Israeli and Palestinian
assessments of the other side's actions. This was illustrated early in
February 1999 when conflict arose not only between Israel and the
PA, but also between Israel and the United States. Evidence of
107. Id.
108. David Kimche, From Honest Broker to Judge, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 2,
1998, at 8.
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stressed U.S.-Israeli relations became apparent with Netanyahu's
challenge to the CIA to disprove his claim that Palestinians had
released Islamic militants, murderers not only of Israeli citizens, but
also of five American citizens in Israel."' The CIA responded not
with a denial, but with the statement that the "'US government has
no firm information linking the individuals (named by the Israeli
government) to the murders of... American citizens.""' 6 Indeed, this
tension in the relationship between Israel and the United States
became only more pronounced as the latter disagreed with the
former's assessment of Palestinian violations of the Memorandum,
and at the same time maintained its own fulfillment of
commitments."7 The United States in fact suspended its transfer of
the $1.2 billion of special aid promised to Israel upon the signing of
the WRM."' At the same time, the Palestinians were assured that
their own special aid package would not be delayed."9 Israel
contended that it should be receiving commensurate funding, as it
had carried out the first of three redeployments from territory in the
West Bank.20 In response to Israel's claim, Stuart Eizenstat, U.S.
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, extended the United
States' view that Israel would receive aid only if all obligations were
carried out.2 '
On the Palestinian side, reaction to the U.S. intervention has
been predominately negative. Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, member of the
Palestinian Legislative Council and former Palestinian Minister of
Higher Education, stated, "Historically, the Palestinian people have
not trusted the CIA, nor any other intelligence apparatus, since they
see such trust as a historical irony .... Consequently, I imagine that
the Palestinian people, in general, do not want the CIA to have this
sort of presence in the region.""
115. See Danna Harman, PM Insists PA Released Terrorist Bombers, JERUSALEM
POST, Feb. 2, 1999, at 2.
116. Id.
117. See Ze'ev Schiff, U.S. Stops Payment on $1.2 Billion in Wye Aid to Israel





122. Abir Aqi et al., Arab Leaders' Reactions to Wye Pact, FBIS-NES-98-312, Nov.
8, 1998, at 2.
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Indeed Ashrawi deemed the United States to be an unfair
arbitrator since they failed "to put an end to the building of new
settlements and ... to take neutral positions on other issues."'" This
sentiment was echoed by Ghassan Khatib, a journalist for the
Palestine Report, who argued that the U.S. role in the peace process is
"unhealthy" since it "does not even try to compensate for the
imbalance of powers,"'' suggesting Israel's advantage in wooing
American support. Al-Barghuthi, leader of the Palestinian People's
Party (successor to the Palestinian Communist Party), also expressed
fears of U.S. partiality:
"The fact that the United States is single-handedly undertaking the
role of the international mediator in the peace process, its bias in
favor of Israel, and the White House's vulnerability to tremendous
pressures from the Jewish lobby in the United States, makes it
exceedingly difficult for this role to be entirely unbiased."'
1
Several commentators have also argued that the United States'
intervention could infringe on Palestinian civil liberties. Dr. Bashir
Musa Nafi, a researcher of modem history, succinctly summarized
this oft-repeated theme:
The second level [of U.S. intervention] pertains to giving the
Americans the right to interpret the nature of the Islamic forces'
infrastructures (the Palestinian popular institutions) and determine
the dividing line between what is political and what is military in
the work of these infrastructures, in the enactment of laws that deal
with the Palestinian opposition forces, in determining the limits of
legitimate political expression and the limits of incitement to
violence, and in determining who is a political struggler and who is
abetting military activity against the Israelis. This is an active
multilevel role that affects the nature and scope of the work of the
Palestinian police, the various security services, the prisons and
detention camps, the media, and the parliament. This is a masked
American hegemony affecting the essence of the Palestinian
independence and sovereignty claims.' 26
123. Id.
124. Ghassan Khatib, Compromising the Compromise, PALESTINE REP., Nov. 13,
1998, at 16.
125. Id.
126. Dr. Bashir Musa Nafi, Israel: Paper on the CIA Interference in PA Affairs,
FBIS-NES-98-312, Nov. 8, 1998, at 4. Dr. Nafi's argument continued as follows:
The American intelligence's enthusiasm to assume its new role in Palestine
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Although some observers of U.S. involvement are primarily
concerned by the potential curtailment of freedom of expression in
PA governed areas,'27 others have condemned the U.S. role for
security reasons. Palestinian Legislative Council Member Hosam
Khader, for example, stated, "I'm afraid our entire security apparatus
will become an extra-territorial department of the CIA.""'
The Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organization Hamas has
categorically denounced the new U.S. role. A Hamas spokesman
called the WRM "a security pact between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority," where the "Israelis, Americans, and the PA are all after
Hamas."'29 In a similar vein, Dr. Muhmud al-Zahhar, a leader of the
Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip, noted that "'a new enemy-
namely, the United States-has been mobilized in the region, which
will create an unbalanced situation.""'  Furthermore, Hamas leader
Shaykh Ahmad Yasin argued that Arafat made terrible concessions
to Israel and the United States: "The Americans and Israelis have
finally managed to turn the Palestinian autonomy government into
Israel's watchdog .... The moment that Arafat sat down at the
negotiating table with the Israelis he stopped being a liberation
fighter." 3'
Aside from the extensive Israeli and Palestinian analysis and
commentary on the United States' expanded role, there has been
heightened American review of the subject. Initially, many political
observers argued that Clinton was motivated to participate in Wye to
deflect the nation's attention from the controversy concerning his
highly publicized extra-marital affair with a White House intern. As
reminds us of the ugly American legacy in the sixties and seventies when
CIA agents from Indonesia to El Salvador were defending the values of the
free world by strengthening military dictatorships, igniting civil wars, and
participating in unlimited massacres of intellectuals, students and active
trade union members in the Third World. The justification then was
confronting the communist danger. Under what slogan will more Hamas
and Islamic Jihad militants and more Fathi al-Shaqaqi, Yaya 'Ayyash, al-
Sharif, and 'Awadallah be liquidated today?
Id.
127. See, e.g., SAID K. ABURISH, ARAFAT: FROM DEFENDER TO DIcTATOR 262-325
(1998).
128. Khaled Amayreh, On the Seventh Day, AL-AHRAM, Nov. 4, 1998, at 1.
129. Id.
130. Abir Aql et al., supra note 122.
131. West Bank and Gaza Strip: Shaykh Yasin Says Peace Process Has 'Definitely
Failed,' supra note 83.
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one journalist wrote, the President's involvement in Wye "provided a
stage for Clinton... to play statesman instead of defendant."132
Indeed, Clinton himself played a major role in the WRM
negotiations, much like Carter did twenty years ago at the Camp
David negotiations. 33
2. The CIA
The most discussed aspect of American participation in the
WRM, however, was not Clinton's contribution to the negotiations,
but rather the CIA's high level of involvement in the agreement's
implementation. Edward Djerejian, Director of the Baker Institute
for Public Policy at Rice University and former U.S. Ambassador to
Israel, explained that "'the CIA would serve as the bridge between
the two sides,' because the lack of confidence between the
Palestinians and the Israelis had reduced the effectiveness of any
security meeting between them."'3' Djerejian added that "'the CIA
could play a role of agent or honest broker.""35 The American media
has been so critical of this role that the CIA director, George Tenet,
wrote an editorial for the New York Times clarifying the CIA's
involvement:
For many years the C.I.A. has been working with the Israeli
Government and the Palestinian Authority to combat terrorists in
their midst ....
... There is nothing new in this role for the CIA.
Another part of our mission will be to keep American policy
makers informed about how the agreement they brokered is being
carried out. Again, there is nothing new in this. The agency has
long assisted policy makers in their efforts to make international
132. J. F. 0. McAllister, Inside Wye Plantation, TIME, Nov. 2, 1998, at 38,40.
133. Although in both cases the Presidents of the United States cleared their
schedules and became personally involved with the talks, there are some
fundamental differences between the talks at Camp David and the negotiations at
Wye Plantation. In the former case, Carter simply brought Egypt and Israel
together. The actual agreement, however, was not negotiated and definitely not
signed at Camp David. By contrast, Clinton not only brought the Palestinians and
Israelis together, but also pushed them to sign an agreement under American
auspices. In sum, their tactics were similar, but they yielded different results.
134. Yasin, supra note 95.
135. Id.
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agreements viable."'
Tenet did acknowledge, however, a difference between this specific
project and previous Agency assignments. 37 According to Tenet,
"What is slightly unusual in the current case is that the agency's role
has become widely publicized. But this won't change our role, which
will continue as before."'38
Tenet rebuffed the fear that the CIA's participation in the
Middle East might be dangerous."9 "The CIA is not interposing itself
between combatants," he stated.141 "We are not placing officers inside
the security operations of either side. We will not arrest or
interrogate people or assume any other direct role on the ground ....
In sum, the C.I.A. is not making policy, but helping carry it out.' 4' It
is precisely this function, however, that certain observers have
criticized. Senator Richard Shelby, chairman of the Senate
Committee on Intelligence, expressed "concern[] about 'expanding
the (CIA) role as the implementer of policy here, which is a big
departure [from the past]." 42 This concern was reiterated by Dov
Zakim, former U.S. Defense Department official under Reagan. He
argued that "restricting the CIA's work in this way is very serious





II. Problems Arising Since the Signing of the Memorandum
Since the signing of the WRM, the peace process has been
plagued by breakdowns and disruptions. The first mini-crisis came
less than a week after the Memorandum was signed. On October 27,
1998, according to Netanyahu's spokesman Aviv Bushinsky, the




139. This suggestion was made, for example, by Douglas Waller: "By helping
Arafat crack down on Hamas, the CIA may invite attack against American targets,
including strikes against CIA staff in the region." See Douglas Waller, Coming in
from the Cold, TIME, Nov. 2, 1998, at 46,46.
140. Tenet, supra note 136, at A23.
141. Id.
142. Frederic J. Frommer, The CIA Role: Danger Ahead, JERUSALEM REPORT,
Nov. 23, 1998, at 28.
143. Yasin, supra note 95.
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Palestinians had verbally agreed to present a detailed plan on
combating terrorism to the Americans by the end of the week."
Israeli sources then learned that the PA had informed the American
delegation that it would not be able to complete its work plan on
time. However, the WRM requires that the agreement be
implemented, regardless of whether the cabinet ratifies a deal,
"[u]pon [e]ntry into [florce of the [m]emorandum," which meant ten
days after the agreement was signed."' Nonetheless, the Prime
Minister's Office declared that it would not "be able to begin
implementation of the agreement until [the work plan of the
Palestinians] is completed."'" The following day, however, chief
Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat announced that the PA "'will be
sharing our security paper with the Americans when the
implementation period begins-Monday [November 2, 1998]-as was
agreed upon."' 7 Bushinsky said that Israel had understood that the
plan was to be presented by October 30, but would welcome it on
November 2."4 Arafat and Barak had met in order to discuss the
outlined schedule for implementing the WRM.'49 While Barak
preferred to defer the carrying out of the agreement, it was clear that
the PA expected the WRM's full and immediate implementation.5"
Barak reiterated his promise to fulfill the agreement in any case, but
added, "If it is decided not to adopt the variations we have brought
up, both sides understand what this means. We will both have to
carry the responsibility of the consequences.'5i. Thus, even in the
very first days of the WRM, the PA and Israel began jockeying for
position. These typical inconsistencies added anxiety to the stressed
Israeli-PA relations and weakened the peace process.
144. See Danna Harman, Wye on Hold Until PA Produces Security Paper,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 28, 1998, at 1.
145. WRM, supra note 18, Time Line § 1, at 12.
146. Harman, supra note 144.
147. Danna Harman & Hillel Kuttler, PA: Security Plan Will Be in on Monday,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 29, 1998, at 1.
148. See id.
149. See Harman, supra note 15.
150. See Danna Harman, Barak to Woo Mubarak Over Wye Delay, JERUSALEM
POST, July 29, 1999, at 1.
151. See Harman, supra note 15.
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A. Immediate Doubts
Violent terrorist clashes and political reverberation plagued the
implementation of interim agreements including the WRM. 52  A
dangerous crisis erupted less than a week after the signing of the
WRM, on October 29, 1998, when a Hamas suicide bomber set out to
blow up a school bus filled with children in the Gaza Strip's Gush
Katifi53 An Israeli soldier, driving an escort Jeep, intercepted the
speeding van."54 Though he was killed in the explosion, he managed
to avert the greater calamity."' Netanyahu immediately called for
Arafat to crack down on terrorism.' The following day, the PA
claimed to have arrested dozens of Hamas activists."' In an
unprecedented move, Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin
was also placed under house arrest."'
On November 6, 1998, Islamic Jihad staged its own suicide
bombing attempt at the crowded outdoor market Machane Yehudah.
Although only the two bombers died, twenty-four Israelis were
injured.59 As a result of the attack, Netanyahu canceled his next
cabinet meeting, which was to precede the Knesset's ratification of
the Memorandum. Once the Prime Minister's Office was assured that
the PA was taking steps to prevent further attacks, it reconvened the
cabinet on November 11.'"
152. In the opinion of the author, the increasing violence of Palestinians against
IDF soldiers may be due to the widespread anti-Semitism in Arab newspapers and
textbooks. Jewish Knesset members discussed anti-Jewish statements in newspapers
from Palestinian-controlled areas and surrounding Arab countries in a day-long study
session with Arab Knesset members in May 2000. MKs Study Arab Anti-Semitism,
JERUSALEM POST, May 23, 2000, at 5. Itamar Marcus, leader of the group, noted that
the study "showed that 'the peace process has not had an effect on education."' Id.
Jewish Knesset members warned that such widespread anti-Semitic incitement could
hurt the peace process. See id.
153. See Danna Harman et al., PA Puts Yassin Under House Arrest, JERUSALEM






159. See Said Ghazali, The Ball is in Netanyahu's Court, JERUSALEM TIMEs, Nov.
13, 1998, at 3.
160. A senior Palestinian security officer warned that such violent attacks by
Islamic militants are likely to increase due to Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon,
which they view as proof of the effectiveness of Hizbullah tactics. See Lamia Lahoud
& Margot Dudkevitch, Palestinian Officer Warns of Hamas Attacks, JERUSALEM
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The following day, however, another controversy broke out.161
The Israeli government decided to issue tenders for 1,000 apartments
at Har Homa in southeastern Jerusalem.162 Although this step did not
breach any aspect of the WRM, Clinton's spokesman denounced it
for breaking the "'spirit of the Wye agreement"' and for inhibiting "'a
positive atmosphere for permanent-status talks."' 1  Arafat initially
contained his rage, merely calling the move a "'big obstacle"' to
peace.1
However, two days later, on the tenth anniversary of the PLO's
declaration of independence, Arafat's words to thousands of
Palestinians were more ardent: "'We are going to build our state with
Jerusalem as its capital.... Centimeter by centimeter we will get land
to build our state for May 1999."16' On November 15, Arafat's
language turned more aggressive and militant: "'Our rifles are ready,
and we are ready to raise them if [the Israelis] try to stop us from
praying in the holy city of Jerusalem.""' He also declared that if
Israel does not want to continue working toward peace, he would
resume the intifada.1 67 Netanyahu strongly condemned Arafat's
statements while Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon reacted by telling
Jewish "settlers to 'run and capture as many hills as
possible .... Everything we don't take will eventually get into the
hands of the Palestinians.... ,,,16
Despite this volley of verbal attacks, the Knesset ratified the
Memorandum on November 17, 1998 and the following day Israel
resumed negotiations with the Palestinians.1 69 Three days later, Israel
began Stage One of the Further Redeployments ("FRD") according
POST, June 4,2000, at 3.
161. See Hillel Kuttler et al., US Slams Har Homa Tenders, JERUSALEM POST,




165. Jerrold Kessel et al., Arafat Assures Crowd He Will Declare Independent State
(Nov. 14,1998) <http:llwww.cnn.comIWORLD/meast/9811/14/israel.arafatl>.
166. Danna Harman et al., Arafat Warns: Our Rifles Are Ready, JERUSALEM POST,
Nov. 16,1998, at 1.
167. In the light of subsequent events, this threat has been substantiated.
168. Danna Harman et al., US: Halt the War of Words, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 17,
1998, at 1.
169. See Nina Gilbert et al., Knesset Approves Wye, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 18,
1998, at 1.
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to Article I(A) of the WRM.' ° This stage was completed on
November 22, 1998; it was the first transfer of territory to the
Palestinians in nearly two years.' At the same time that the FRD
was taking place, Netanyahu also released 250 Palestinian prisoners
from Israeli jails.' This move caused a major uproar by the PA
because they claimed that 150 of these people were "'common
criminals,"' not "'political prisoners. ' 7  Palestinian Security Chief
Mohammed Dahlan called the prisoner release "'a scandal.""'74
Netanyahu retorted by saying, "'What do they [the Palestinians]
expect of us? That murderers of children and bombers be let out of
jail soon after they attack us? I suggest that the Palestinians stop
harboring illusions."
7 5
Relations between Israel and the PA were increasingly strained
as protests over the prisoner issue continued in the Palestinian-
controlled areas. Tensions between Israel and the PA escalated after
November 30, 1998 when Arafat referred to Jerusalem as an occupied
area. 176 Pressures mounted after a Palestinian mob attacked an IDF
soldier and an Israeli civilian driving near Ramallah." The Israeli
government warned the PA that Stage 2 of the redeployment would
not take place "if it does not halt violence, accept that prisoners with
blood on their hands will not be released, and renounce its intention
to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state."' 78 On December 7, 1998,
former Israeli Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon officially announced
that Israel would not conduct Stage 2 of the FRD on the eighteenth
as scheduled by the WRM. 179 The reason, he said, was that the PA
170. See West Bank Land Transfer Underway (Nov. 20, 1999)
<http://www.cnn.comiWORLD/meast/9811/20/mideast.01/index.html>.
171. See id.
172. This action was in accordance with Article XVI of the Oslo II Agreement,
and was part of a verbal agreement made at the Wye Plantation negotiations. See
Oslo II, supra note 19 art. XVI, at 19.
173. Danna Harman, Dahlan: Prisoner Release a 'Scandal,' JERUSALEM POST, Nov.
22, 1998, at 1.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Hillel Kuttler, US Officials Downplay Arafat J'lem Statement, JERUSALEM
POST, Dec. 2, 1998, at 2.
177. See Liat Collins et al., Gov't Threatens to Halt Pullouts, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 3, 1998, at 1.
178. Id.
179. See Danna Harman & Hillel Kuttler, Sharon Tells Albright: Redeployment
Won't Take Place on Time, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at 1.
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had "violated 'each and every one of the sections of the Wye accord
and because of the incitement by the PA for a new intifada."" In the
following two days, two Palestinians were killed and 100 others were
wounded during violent clashes over the Palestinian prisoner issue in
the West Bank and Jerusalem. 1
Despite Clinton's visit to the Middle East and the PLO's
annulment of the Covenant,1" Israel stood firm on its decision to
defer Stage 2 of the FRD. Since then, no further steps were taken to
implement the WRM. On December 21, 1999, Israel passed the first
reading of a bill to hold new elections for the Knesset.'" After being
approved by the Knesset Constitution Committee, the government
was dissolved and campaigning began."M Amidst this political turmoil,
Netanyahu maintained his willingness to conduct the second
redeployment on the condition that the PA curtail incitement to
violence, reduce the Palestinian police force, and renounce their
unilateral threat to declare a Palestinian state on May 4, 1 99 9 ."
180. Id.
181. See Margot Dudkevitch, 1 Killed in 'Intifada Day' Riots, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 10, 1998, at 1.
182. Alan Philps, Palestinian Vote Clears Way for Summit, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(LONDON), Dec. 15, 1998, at 1.
183. See Israel Poised to Hold Early Elections (Dec. 21, 1999)
<http:llwww.cnn.com/world/meast/9812/21/israel.04/>.
184. See Online NewsHour (PBS), Back to the Polls (Dec. 22, 1998)
<http:lwww.pbs.orglnewshour/bb/middle-eastjuly-dec98/israel_12.22.htmll>.
185. Arafat declared Palestinian independence on Nov. 15,1988, but the declaration
was widely perceived as a symbolic act. See Arafat Plans to Declare Statehood in 1999,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 14, 1997, at 2. "The Palestinians never delineated the
boundaries of their state and most countries have not recognized it." Id. Prime Minister
Netanyahu's senior advisor David Bar-Illan indicated support for a demilitarized
Palestinian state. See David Makovsky, Likud's Silence Hints Approval of Bar-Illan
Views on Palestinian State, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 23, 1996, at 2. This trial balloon,
which Netanyahu did not disavow, is evidence of further ideological evolution on the
part of Israel's right wing, away from the concept that Israel must prevent Palestinian
statehood. See id. Netanyahu also denied that Israel wanted there to be a "fully
sovereign" Palestinian state, which could threaten Israeli security. Liat Collins, PM Says
No to Fully Sovereign Palestinian State, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 21, 1997, at 1. His
government's Infrastructure Minister Ariel Sharon acknowledged, however, that while
he opposed Palestinian statehood, "[tihe Oslo Accords mean Palestinian statehood."
Jay Bushinsky, Sharon Map: Two Buffer Zones, PA 'Islands,' JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 3,
1997, at 1. The Labor Party voted that it would be willing to accept a Palestinian state if
it had limited sovereignty, was demilitarized, was prevented from forming military
alliances with other states and its air space was open to the Israel Air Force. See Sarah
Honig, Labor Plank Allows for Palestinian State, JERUSALEM POST, May 15, 1997, at 1.
Arafat subsequently changed the date of the unilateral declaration to declare a
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An additional scenario of violence in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip occurred on May 16, 2000 (Nakba Day) when Palestinian
protests resulted in at least four Palestinians killed and more than 320
injured, while five IDF soldiers and border policemen sustained
gunshot wounds inflicted by the Palestinian police." Moreover, nine
Israeli security personnel were injured by stones and firebombs.' 7 A
Palestinian security officer stated that Arafat's Fatah called for the
riots, but did not expect the degree of violence that actually
transpired.'" The violence continued in other parts of the West Bank
as Palestinian policemen fired upon IDF troops, seriously wounding
an IDF Deputy Commander.9
B. Difficulties in Gauging Palestinian Compliance
In early June 1999, the Israeli government submitted a request to
the PA for the extradition of Mohammed Deif, head of Izzadin
Kassam, Hamas's military wing, who was believed to be responsible
for the deaths of forty-seven and the wounding of ninety-six.9
Israel's most wanted terrorist, "Deif was involved in the abduction
and subsequent killing of soldier Nachshon Wachsman in October
1994;" he was also involved in the October 30, 1998 attempted
bombing of a school bus in which one soldier was killed as he
prevented the possible deaths of thirty-four children on board, as well
as other attacks. 9' This prisoner request was significant in relation to
Palestinian state from May 4, 1999 to September 13, 2000. See Jane Perlez, Clinton
Meets with Arafat to Seek Final Accord with Israel, N.Y. TIMEs, April 20,2000, at All.
186. See Margot Dudkevitch et al., PA Police Open Fire on IDF in West Bank and
Gaza Protests, JERUSALEM POST, May 16, 2000, at 1. Nakba Day marks the
Palestinian remembrance of the "disastrous" day of Israeli independence. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Palestinian police are not trained as security forces, but as a military force to
carry out "maneuvers, exercises and live drills throughout the Palestinian Authority
controlled areas." Margot Dudkevitch, Officials: Palestinians Creating an Army,
JERUSALEM POST, May 31, 2000, at 2. An Israeli security official stated that the
forces are training to protect Area A. See id. Another official stated that the PA
police and other security forces have been implementing military-style operations
and have focused less on community service and combating crime from the very
beginning. See id.
190. See Dan Izenberg, Gov't Requests Extradition of Deif, JERUSALEM POST, June
30, 1999, at2.
191. Id. Deif was also involved in the December 25, 1994 attack on Israelis in
which a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device near a bus full of soldiers in
Jerusalem, injuring twelve; the attack of February 26, 1996, in which a suicide bomber
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the WRM because "Deif is the 45th Palestinian terrorist whose
extradition has been sought by Israel since the signing of the Oslo
Accords. The PA has not handed over any of them."'
92
C. Jewish "Settlements"
While in office, Prime Minister Netanyahu "stressed that 'we
have never had an agreement, either before or after Wye, to limit our
activities in the settlements[;] ... nor is this part of Oslo.""' U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk,
however, condemned Israel's expansion of settlements while
acknowledging that no specific agreement existed limiting building."9
"According to Marwan Barghouti, a Palestinian legislator and
secretary-general of Fatah, 'Settlement is an organized, criminal act of
terrorism. The time has come to resist it by all means .... We are
required to stop the negotiations unless settlement is stopped."' 95
Arafat has issued similar statements, holding that Israeli settlement-
building activity is illegal and harmful to the peace process.'96 A
Fatah pamphlet proclaims, "'The protests will ignite the land under
the settlers' feet and they will leave forever.""9' Palestinians believe
that the Netanyahu government "set the stage for a massive
expansion of settlements by founding 23 settlements which could be
consolidated."'' The PA thus seeks to curb all settlement activity
under Barak.' In a meeting with Barak, Arafat called on the Prime
Minister to "'cease all settlement activities which are illegal and
destructive to the peace process."' 2°' The Prime Minister, when
detonated an explosive device on bus No. 18 in Jerusalem, killing twenty-five and
wounding forty-six; and the attack of March 3, 1996, when a suicide bomber
detonated a bomb on another bus No. 18 in Jerusalem, killing nineteen and wounding
six. See id.
192. Id.
193. Danna Harman, Indyk Slams Settlement Policy, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 12,
1999, at 1.
194. See id.
195. Begin Final-Status Talks, JERUSALEM POST, June 4,1999, at 8.
196. See Ahmad al-Mashharawi, Al-Quds: Items Not Implemented by Israel,
WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Feb. 8, 2000.
197. Begin Final Status Talks, JERUSALEM POST, June 4, 1999, at 8.
198. Ben Lynfield, Palestinian Leaders Concerned about Barak's Intentions,
JERUSALEM POST, June 1,1999, at 2.
199. See al-Mashharawi, supra note 196.
200. Harman, supra note 15.
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questioned by a journalist concerning Arafat's statement, gave no
response."°
UI. A New Lease on Life for the Peace Process
In light of the unstable situation in the Middle East after the
agreement was signed, one must question the effectiveness of the
WRM. On the whole, the WRM created an ephemeral burst of
energy in the region. It briefly revitalized the peace process after a
nineteen-month impasse and made possible some important
achievements,2° among which were the annulment of the Palestinian
National Covenant, the opening of the Gaza Airport, and the transfer
of 2% of Area C to Area B, and 7.1% from Area B to Area A."
Although each of these steps was significant, they only dealt with
issues pertaining to the interim agreement phase. The WRM failed to
bring the Palestinian and the Israeli sides closer to resolving final
status issues, a fact that Prime Minister Barak highlighted and applied
to the drafting of the September 4, 1999 Sharm Memorandum.' In
direct relation to the WRM's inadequacies concerning these issues,
Barak proposed that "'we must question what would be the best way
to combine the final-status talks and the implementation of the Wye
agreement."'" 5 The WRM's inability to directly deal with final status
issues stemmed largely from the fact that neither party trusted the
other, a weakness that was both the cause and the result of increased
American intervention in the Middle East peace process. In response
to this, the Sharm Memorandum attempted to marginalize American
intervention, attempting to establish a new basis of trust between the
Israeli and Palestinian leaderships.2°6 The Sharm Memorandum also
constructed a new timeframe for negotiating final status issues."
The parties once again failed to adhere to the timeline and thus
201. See id.
202. See What Does Wye Actually Say (Excerpts From A Jerusalem Post




205. Harman, supra note 15.
206. See Mark A. Heller, The Uniqueness of Wye-II, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 3,
1999, at 8; see also News Agencies, Barak, Arafat Pledge Further Cooperation,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 5, 1999, at 3.
207. See Finally, Final Status, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 14,1999, at 8.
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another round of talks was suggested by Clinton.' By convening a
new summit at Camp David in July 2000, it seemed as if the President
was seeking to ensure a favorable legacy for his presidency by
capping it with a major achievement: final Israeli-Palestinian peace.
A positive outcome of the summit might also have boosted his wife's
appeal to Jewish New Yorkers, and thus her chances in the race for
the U.S. Senate.2"
A. Prospects for Continuation of the Peace Process
There was much speculation concerning the new Prime
Minister's approach to the peace process and the future of Israeli
relations with the United States."' Following the Israeli elections of
May 17, 1998, the United States expressed cautious optimism about
the future of the peace process under Barak. 1 An American official
expressed hope that "negotiations could return to their pre-1996"
form, which means that "America would not have to be the
indispensable partner" that it had become with the Hebron talks,
"and could revert to its role as 'facilitator' or outside advisor-a
function U.S. officials said is healthier for the peace process." '212
Toward the end of the interim period, many Palestinians
expressed the belief that the peace process would crumble if Israeli
government policies did not change with the new administration. 13
Following a day designated for protest, which the Palestinian
leadership called a "Day of Anger," PLO Executive Committee
member Faisal Husseini struck a somber tone: "'We consider the
peace option as our strategic option, but if this policy continues, the
Palestinian peace option will fall down and we will consider other
options. If the Israelis continue like this, our leadership will lose its
credibility among Palestinians.""'2 4
The new Labor Party coalition government of Israel immediately
demonstrated a strong desire to overcome obstacles. Barak, in his
address to the Knesset after being sworn in, pledged to take "bold
208. See Daniel Bloch, Three to Blame, JERUSALEM POST, July 30,2000, at 6.
209. See id.
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steps" to end the Israeli-Arab conflict.2 5 However, as Barak pushed
to bypass the WRM and move to final status negotiations, Hamas
threatened terror in response2"6 Once again, security became the
foremost issue as Hamas tested the PA's commitment to fight
terrorism.217  How could Israel continue its negotiations with the
Palestinian Authority if Israeli citizens were simultaneously being
targeted by terrorist organizations based in PA-controlled areas?
September 4, 1999 marked another historic moment as Israel and
the PA signed a new agreement aimed at facilitating the
implementation of the long stalled WRM: the Sharm Memorandum.218
The Sharm Memorandum was designed with the goal of renegotiating
major issues previously addressed by the WRM. A comparison of the
memoranda makes clear the extent to which the Sharm Memorandum
tackles the problems encountered by the WRM. On the issue of
redeployment, the WRM called for a 13% pullback from the West
Bank to be carried out in three stages over a three month period. 9
Initially, Israeli forces were withdrawn from only 2% of the West
Bank. , Furthermore, some 3% of the remaining pullback (as agreed
upon in the WRM) was designated to enable the creation of a nature
reserve in the Judean Desert."' The Sharm Memorandum differs
from the WRM in that Israel agreed to hand over the remaining 11%
in three stages, without specifying any limitation concerning the
development of the Judean Desert.2,
Regarding the issue of prisoners, the WRM called for the release
of 750 prisoners, of which 250 were subsequently released.' Disputes
have ensued between the PA and Netanyahu (and now Barak) as to
whether this referred to security prisoners or common criminals."
215. See Liat Collins, Barak Pledges 'Bold Steps' For Peace, JERUSALEM POST, July
7, 1999, at 1.
216. See Ben Lynfield et al., PA: Don't Bypass Wye, JERUSALEM POST, July 8,
1999, at 1.
217. See id.
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This issue was one of the most contentious impediments to the
implementation of the WRM. The Sharm Memorandum resolved
this issue by determining that Israel would release 350 security
prisoners.' This compromise represents an active willingness to
meet in the middle. Furthermore, it seems that "Barak's generous
initiatives regarding prisoners and contiguity of territory were . . .
designed to persuade Palestinians" of the sincerity of the Israeli
side.'m
The Sharm Memorandum, which consistently goes a step further
than the WRM, also advances the issue of the Gaza Port. The WRM
merely prescribed committee discussion of the issue, stating that the
Israelis and Palestinians "commit themselves to proceeding without
delay to conclude an agreement to allow the construction and
operation of the port,"' 7 while the Sharm Memorandum calls for the
planning of the port to begin immediately.'
The issue of "safe passage" was similarly advanced by the latter
agreement. 9 The WRM expressed a need to continue working on
the issue, while the Sharm Memorandum warranted that the southern
route would open in October, pending protocol agreement. It is
interesting to note the differences of language and tone between the
agreements. The WRM, with wording both ambiguous and non-
committal, proposed that "the sides will make best efforts to conclude
the agreement"' in regards to the southern route. The expression
"best efforts" is ambiguous and non-committal. In contrast, the
Sharm Memorandum decisively states, "The operation of the
Southern Route of the Safe Passage for the movement of persons,
vehicles, and goods will start on October 1, 1999.. .... 232 The detailed
commitment found in the Sharm Memorandum reflects a renewed
will to work together and move forward, a resoluteness that was
absent during the previous set of negotiations involving the
225. See id.
226. Joseph Alpher, How Historic a Moment?, THE JERUSALEM POST, September
14, 1999, at 1.
227. WRM, supra note 18, art. 111(4), at 10.
228. See Wye Two, supra note 218.
229. Sharm Memorandum, supra note 19.
230. See Danna Harman, Barak, Arafat Sign Sharm Accord, JERUSALEM POST,
Sept. 5,1999, at 1.
231. WRM, supra note 18, art. 111(3), at 10.
232. Sharm Memorandum, supra note 19, § 5(a).
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Netanyahu administration.
Another striking difference between the two agreements
involves the issue of Hebron. The WRM made no mention of
Hebron. In contrast, the Sharm Memorandum specifically calls for
the reopening of Shuhada Street, the entrance to Hasbahe market,
and requests the establishment of a committee to review the situation
at the Tomb of the Patriarchs. 3 This section of the Sharm
Memorandum is a noteworthy gain for the Palestinian side.
On the issue of security, the Sharm Memorandum reiterates the
exact sentiments expressed in the WRM: The two sides will act "in
accordance with the prior agreements."'' Security has remained a
dominant issue throughout the peace process. Both sides continue to
outwardly express their desire to secure the borders and provide a
safe environment in which to establish peace. However, on this issue,
public opinion has offered harsh criticism of the leaderships.
Therefore, it becomes difficult to gauge whether the Palestinians'
agreement to strict security commitments stems from goodwill toward
the Israelis or from diplomatic pressure. Arafat's motives are
particularly suspect on this point. As it is Arafat's responsibility to
fight against terrorism from within, he plays a role of both leader and
saboteur amongst a divided Palestinian population.
One of the most notable differences between the two agreements
is apparent when considering the way they each approach the issue of
final peace accords. The WRM concluded no specific target date for
final status issues.' The Sharm Memorandum, however, demanded
that within five or six months the two sides should negotiate the
outline of a final status agreement.236 Furthermore, by September 10,
2000, the accord was to have been concluded. 7 One assessment of
Barak's effort to expedite final status negotiations stems from his
awareness that if these issues are not resolved in a year's time they
will not be resolved for many years to come.'
233. Id. § 7.
234. Id. § 8.
235. See Danna Harman, What's in the Accord, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 25, 1998, at
1.
236. See id.
237. See Danna Harman, Wye, Sharm-What's the Difference?, JERUSALEM POST,
Sept. 5, 1999, at 1.
238. See Samih Shabib, Negotiations and After, JERUSALEM TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at
5; see also al-Mashharawi, supra note 196. The coalition instability of the Barak
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Another important issue differentiating the WRM from the
Sharm Memorandum is that of the U.S. role in the peace process.
The heavy American involvement in the negotiation and
implementation of the WRM was not looked upon favorably.n9 In
her speech at the signing ceremony of the Sharm Memorandum, U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright "welcomed Israeli and
Palestinian willingness to do most of the negotiating without
mediators, building trust and confidence after years of bitteress.
240
Despite the outward efforts to minimize American involvement, the
loss of this involvement was not deemed beneficial by the Palestinian
leadership.41 Arafat told a group of American analysts that he was
"seeking to draw in the U.S. at 'all levels' of the final-status talks."242
Indeed, the Americans later vehemently reasserted their place in the
peace process with Clinton virtually insisting that a summit between
Israel and the Palestinians take place in July 2000.3
Nevertheless, at this point in the peace process, it has become
crucial for Arafat to reassert his ability to act as a trustworthy
partner. However, his behavior has thus far demonstrated just the
opposite. During the Netanyahu administration, Arafat declared that
peace must be based on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 of
1947.2' A demand for peace based on Resolution 181 is in direct
contrast to Oslo, which is explicitly based on U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 242, 338 and 425.245 These latter resolutions call for a
return of territories captured in 1967 in exchange for peace.246
Arafat's attempt to move the goal posts in the middle of the game
created doubt as to his commitment to the terms of reference of the
Oslo process. Some believe that Arafat "wants a peace process, not
government could result in early elections. This would lead to uncertain implications
for the peace process.
239. See Abdallah Awwad, US Role in Palestinian-Israeli Talks, WORLD NEWS
CONNECTION, Feb. 24,2000.
240. Jonathan Wright, Albright Sees New Tnst Between Israel, Palestinians,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 5, 1999, at 3.
241. See Jerusalem Post Staff, Arafat Seeks Deep US Role in Final-Status Talks,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 26, 1999, at 1.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. See al-Mashharawi, supra note 196.
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peace. Because real peace-a real final status-means the
obsolescence of the Palestinian cause and the end of the Palestinian
dream. Those he is not prepared to give up."2 47  To enjoy the
outpouring of foreign support for the signing of the Sharm
Memorandum, however, Arafat was forced to drop his claim to a
Palestinian state based on Resolution 181 and reestablish a
commitment to peace based on the framework of the Oslo
agreements.2' Still, at the Camp David summit, Arafat seemed to
have had unrealistic goals in mind, insisting on full Palestinian
sovereignty over Israel's capital, Jerusalem, and rejecting offers that
would go so far as to give Palestinians sovereignty over the eastern
sector, with PA civil administration in Arab quarters.249
B. Permanent Status Issues
1. Configuration of a Palestinian State
When considering the future of the Palestinian entity, one must
focus on the basic elements of a state: infrastructure, educational
system, police force, army, and judicial system. But equally crucial to
a fledgling state is a sense of a common destiny. Moreover, a
recognized leadership must mobilize the people to strive toward that
end. It is in the area of leadership, more than any other, that the
Palestinians are severely lacking. This was illustrated by the poor
showing of Palestinian civilians at the "Day of Rage," when
demonstrations against the West Bank Jewish settlement movement
were organized by PA officials. There was, at the time, visible and
"growing alienation between the Palestinian leaders and the general
public." Prior to the Al-Aqsa Intifada, a myriad of public opinion
polls taken in the territories showed a sharp decline in support for
247. Charles Krauthammer, Moving the Goal Posts, JERUSALEM POST, June 8,
1999, at 8.
248. See Danna Harman, US Said Pinning Hopes on Stockholm Talks, JERUSALEM
POST, May 19, 2000, at 3A. Led by Internal Security Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami and
Palestinian Legislative Council Speaker Ahmed Qurie, in May 2000, Israeli and
Palestinian officials met for secret talks in Stockholm (in place of official talks) to
achieve a final framework agreement. See id.
249. See Ragheb Maraya, Summit Ends Without Agreement, JERUSALEM TIMES,
July 21, 2000, at 1.
250. Danny Rubinstein, Day of Alienation, HA'ARETZ, June 7, 1999, at 4.
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both the PA and its Chairman. "1 The masses simply did not seem
willing to mobilize in support of either' 2 Undeniably, widespread
corruption in the Palestinian leadership supports the notion of many
that the Palestinian government is one of "thieves." One indication
of the extent of the corruption was revealed when the former head of
the Palestinian budget committee, Dr. Azmi Shuibi, noted, "'Last
year, when we went to follow up their numbers, we found millions of
dollars credited to various ministries and these ministries insist they
never got them."'' 3 In an editorial in Ha'aretz, journalist Danny
Rubinstein explains:
The growing alienation between the Palestinian leadership and
its public is significant in the diplomatic arena, because it weakens
the Palestinian position. The Palestinian regime's sources of power
and authority are very limited. It does not have financial resources
and is completely dependent on hand-outs and contributions. It
has almost no bargaining chips or tools for the negotiations and
diplomatic struggle.2
In addition to a history of corruption since its founding in 1994,
the PA has also built up a significant record of gross human rights
abuses. A report by the human rights organization B'tselem, accusing
the PA of neglecting basic human rights, blamed "the PA for
imposing capital punishment, carrying out 'mass, arbitrary'
detentions, imprisoning people without trial, using torture, denying
due process of law, and imposing press censorship. 'Since its
establishment in 1994, the PA has systematically violated the rights of
residents under its control."' 5
The London Arabic daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi has no illusions
about the future of a Palestinian state: "'Observers need no further
proofs to get a gloomy picture of the future of the Palestinian entity
now being forged. All the facts on the ground show that it will not be
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Nonetheless, support for a Palestinian state is strong among
some. The Jerusalem Times reported, next to a picture of Jordanian
King Abdullah II smiling next to Yasser Arafat, that Jordanian
Foreign Minister Abdel Illah Al-Khatib indicated that "'Jordan
stands behind the rights of the Palestinian people and endorses
Palestinian aspirations for an independent state on the land occupied
by Israel in June 1967 including East Jerusalem as capital.' 
'2 7
2. Palestinian Prisoners
Palestinians consider the release of Palestinian prisoners held in
Israeli jails to be a crucial aspect of the final status negotiations."
Palestinian "Cabinet Minister Tayyeb Abdel Rahim[, speaking on
behalf of Arafat] said . . . that no framework agreement for Final
Status Negotiations could be signed unless all of the prisoners were
released first." 9 To the Israelis, this is not even a possibility, as they
decline to consider the issue of prisoners outside of the framework of
constructing a final status agreement.
3. The Political and Religious Status of Jerusalem
In 1999, Barak's spokeswoman asserted that the then Prime
Minister-elect's position on Jerusalem was clear: "'No one can tell us
when and where to build."'" Subsequently, in an attempt to appease
Palestinian demands over Jerusalem, Barak announced that the
neighborhood of Abu Dis would not be included in his vision of a
united Jerusalem.2' He said, "there is 'no interest' in annexing the
INSTITUTE, "The Logic of Force and Violence": Beatings of Legislators and Executives
in the Palestinian Authority (May 18, 2000) <http://www.memri.org/ia/IA2700.html>
(quoting AL-QUDS AL-ARABI, Apr. 21, 2000).
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JERUSALEM TIMES, May 26, 2000, at 1. The PA Minister of Local Government and
head of the interim period talks, Sa'eb Erekat, wrote a letter on May 26, 2000 to his
Israeli counterpart, Oded Eran, demanding that he make his best efforts to release all
Palestinian prisoners in accordance with his understanding of the peace process. See
id.
259. PNA Links Prisoner Issue to Final Status Framework, JERUSALEM TIMES,
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approximately 50,000 Palestinians living in villages on the capital's
outskirts, such as Abu Dis and Anata. '26' This announcement was not
received well by members of Barak's Cabinet at that juncture.
Interior Minister Natan Sharanksy, from the Yisrael Ba'aliya Party,
said, "'To transfer Abu Dis and another two villages ... as an
advance payment means the main course will be east Jerusalem,
which we oppose,"' adding that "it is 'a terrible mistake' to offer the
PA military control of an area adjoining Jerusalem and that separates
it from Ma'aleh Adumim."26
Apparently, Abu Dis is not enough. Responding to reports that
Barak was intending to swap Arab villages surrounding Jerusalem for
Israeli annexation of Jewish suburbs around the city, Palestinian
Legislative Council Speaker Ahmed Qurei sounded an ominous note:
"'Should the reports be true, it will be more than a crisis. ' '  Nabil
Amr, Palestinian Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, "said the
decision could trigger open confrontation.,
265
Along these lines, the day that the Israeli Cabinet and Knesset
voted to hand over Abu Dis and other villages to the PA, street
violence erupted, apparently as a popular expression of frustration
with the continued imprisonment of Palestinians convicted of security
offenses.2f Palestinian policemen fired live ammunition at Israeli
soldiers. 67 After pushing the vote through the Cabinet and Knesset,
Barak told Arafat that "there would be no handover of the villages
unless quiet is restored to the territories."' '
What has become clear from the latest round of trilateral
negotiations, those of the two week long July 2000 summit at Camp
David, Maryland ("Camp David II"), is that the key to achieving final
has since complained that Israel has not pulled out of Abu Dis, which was approved
and subsequently delayed by the government. See Lamia Lahoud et al., Israel Will
Ask Albright to Press Palestinians on Ending Violence, JERUSALEM POST, June 4,
2000, at 1.
262 Harman, supra note 261.
263. David Zev Harris, Barak's Land 'Advance' Bid to PA Jolts Government,
JERUSALEM POST, May 1, 2000, at 1.
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265. Id.
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peace is indeed to resolve the question of sovereignty over
Jerusalem.269 One Israeli source speculating on the outcome of the
summit declared, "'[I]f you solve Jerusalem, the other issues fall into
place."' 20  Unfortunately, the question of Jerusalem's future could
not be determined in spite of the quiet, rural setting and intense,
round-the-clock negotiations that hoped to write the final chapter of
the long and arduous tale of reconciliation between Israelis and
Palestinians. The Trilateral Statement issued by the White House"'
after the summit's end was neither innovative nor reassuring as
regards the prospects for peaceful coexistence between Israelis and
Palestinians. In fact, in the aftermath of Camp David II, Prime
Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat returned to the Middle East to
find the atmosphere more volatile and anger-driven than it was when
they left. Clinton, however, maintained that progress had indeed
been made, even though the talks collapsed before common ground
could be reached on the subject of Jerusalem. In a discussion of
Clinton's viewpoint at the Brookings Institute, Prime Minister Barak
was applauded for demonstrating courage, vision and an
understanding of the historical importance of this moment and it was
implied that Chairman Arafat too remains committed to the path of
peace."
Despite Israel's offer of approximately 90% of the West Bank to
Palestinians in exchange for their agreement that Jerusalem remain
under Israeli sovereignty, the parties walked away, once again,
empty-handed.273 As PA Minister Jamil Tarifi explained, Palestinians
would not accept "'anything less"' than a settlement placing
Jerusalem under Palestinian authority.24 He declared, "'Israel must
return 100 percent of the West Bank, including east Jerusalem. We
refuse to get into the game of percentages with the Israelis.', 27 One
269. See Janine Zacharia & Danna Harman, Summit Collapses Without
Agreement, JERUSALEM POST, July 25, 2000, at 1.
270. Janine Zacharia & Lamia Lahoud, Parties Try To Draft Accord, JERUSALEM
POST, July 25, 2000, at 1.
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2000, at 1.
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Arab journalist predicted that "'[v]iolence is certain"' in the
aftermath of the summit, with Islamic radicals potentially using this
latest failure of the peace process to achieve major gains for the
Arabs to capitalize on the deep-rooted hatred of the Israelis and
begin a new round of terrorism including bus bombings and other
random violence against Jews2 6
Clinton has been reluctant to deliver the message that Jerusalem
is the undivided and eternal capital of Israel by moving the U.S.
Embassy there as required by the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act
passed by Congress.2' He has repeatedly exercised his ability to issue
a biannual waiver despite threats of several U.S. senators to amend
the legislation and thereby force the move.278 A marked change in
Clinton's position on the embassy became clear after the close of
Camp David 1I.279 "I have always wanted to move our embassy to
West Jerusalem," the President told Israel's Channel One
Television. ° He explained:
I have not done so because I didn't want to do anything to
undermine our ability to help to broker a secure and fair and lasting
peace for Israelis and for Palestinians. But in light of what has
happened [i.e., the failure of the summit], I've taken that decision
under review, and I'll make a decision sometime between now and
the end of the year on that2"
Attesting to the volatility of the Jerusalem issue, Clinton's
statement was met with a threat to destroy the U.S. Embassy in Israel
and murder the diplomats should the move to Jerusalem be carried
out. He was warned, "'You can move your embassy to Jerusalem and
send your diplomats there. But honest people can turn your embassy
to rubble and send back your diplomats in coffins."'" Similarly,
Ahmed Azhar, a Hamas leader, declared that the move to Jerusalem
"would put US interests in Arab countries 'at risk' and would
276. Janine Zacharia, Finger-Pointing to an Uncertain Future, JERUSALEM POST,
July 26,2000, at 1.
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278. See id.
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threaten world stability."' Furthering this rhetoric, Arafat declared
that the conflict with Israel cannot end without the transfer of East
Jerusalem to Palestinian sovereignty and vowed to declare a
Palestinian state on September 13, 2000 with Jerusalem as its
capital.24 "'Jerusalem is the capital of the state of Palestine and
whoever does not like this,"' he said, "'may drink from the Gaza
Sea."2
5
It appears, however, that the unilateral declaration of a state
would be a detriment to the Palestinian cause. While Arafat has been
trying to shore up support for international recognition of a state,
should one be declared unilaterally, by making trips to Europe and
throughout the Arab world, it is clear that the United States would
not respond kindly to such actions and might even discontinue all
financial aid to the Palestinians.6 Clinton stated, "'If there is (such a
declaration), our entire relationship would be reviewed."'" He
continued,
"I think it would be a big mistake to take a unilateral action and
walk away from the peace process. And if it happens, there will
283. Danna Harman, Clinton Warns Arafat Not to Declare State, JERUSALEM POST,
July 30, 2000, at 1.
284. See Hatem Lutfi, Arafat: No Peace Without Jerusalem, JERUSALEM TIMES,
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Egypt. See PETER MANSFIELD, NASSER 104-05 (1969). In a famous speech by
Nasser, made December 23, 1964, referring to the American ambassador's refusal to
discuss material being obtained from America because "he does not like our
conduct," Nasser informed the crowd, "I would like him to know that whoever does
not like our conduct can go drink up the sea. If the Mediterranean is not sufficient,
there is the Red Sea too." Id. He continued, "We are not ready to accept a single
harsh word from any person. He who speaks a single harsh word to us will have his
tongue cut off. This is how it is-clear and frank words." Id. It appears that Arabs
and other people throughout the Third World were thrilled by Nasser's harsh
wording and daring dismissal of the major world powers and thus "Drink from the
sea!" became a statement of great pride and fearlessness to them. Id. Perhaps
Arafat seeks to rally approval and demonstrate his own fearlessness in the face of
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inevitably be consequences-not just here, but throughout the
world, and things will happen. I would review our entire
relationship, including, but not limited to [financial aid]."
Conclusion and Outlook
After careful examination of the peace process and its
achievements, it is not certain that a continuation of such methods
will lead to the ends sought by either Israel or the Palestinian
Authority. According to an opinion poll of Palestinian residents of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip just weeks before the expiration of the
interim period, the familiar pre-WRM logic reemerged, as residents
simultaneously support both the peace process and armed attacks
against Israelis.' The Center for Palestine Research and Studies,
which conducted the poll, attributes this finding to the fact that
"many Palestinians view [attacks on Israelis] as a means of moving
[the peace process] forward and not as an alternative to it."29° This
suggests that the peace process has not only missed achieving its goals
in the eyes of the Israelis, but that it has even achieved just the
opposite: promoting the idea that through terrorism, Palestinians will
achieve political and territorial gains. It is important to note that
what the Palestinians demand now is
identical to what [they] were demanding when the talks began
seven years ago. Over this period, public opinion in Israel has
shifted radically, and a majority of Israelis now support much more
far-reaching concessions than would have been dreamed of a
decade ago. But the Palestinians have made no concomitant steps
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in Israel's direction: They are still insisting on all or nothing.'
With a terrorist attack on November 7, 1999, those behind it
expressed their opposition to the Sharm Memorandum. 2
Subsequently, two Palestinians were killed and 100 others were
wounded during violent clashes over the Palestinian prisoners issue.'
Once again, terror and violence threatened to seize the spotlight.'
Agreements can offer hope for lasting peace, but cannot guarantee its
fulfillment.
Many Israelis question what Israel has to gain by continuing with
this process. If not true peace and the security for its citizens, is
accommodation to international pressure enough of an incentive for
the redeployment from territories captured in the Six Day War?
What will be Israel's fate if it allows the creation of another hostile
Arab state, this one on its doorstep? The United States' criticism of
Israel when it responds to attacks launched from Lebanese territory
indicates that Israel has negotiated itself into a "no win" situation.
And now, the Palestinians have everything to gain and nothing to
lose. Jordan also seems to be moving toward greater Arab unity,
strengthening ties both with the PA and Syria.
Israeli consensus on the peace process was made clear with the
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292. See Margot Dudkevitch, 1 Killed in 'Intifada Day' Riots, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 10, 1998, at 1.
293. See id.
294. The overall instability of the region has recently been evidenced by a vote of
no confidence in the Knesset of Prime Minister Barak's coalition and a subsequent
call for new elections. Barak's questionable political future and his concentration on
stabilizing his coalition overshadow the peace process. Furthermore, the instability
of the region is underscored by Arafat's recent threat to U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright that Palestinian riots similar to the May 2000 riots will occur
again if Barak does not meet Palestinian expectations with the next Israeli
redeployment, or decides to only transfer 1%. See Janine Zacharia et al., US Hopeful
Palestinian Talks Can Bridge Remaining Gaps, JERUSALEM POST, June 14, 2000, at 1.
Once it is underway, Arafat may be unable to control the violence among the
Palestinians as exemplified by his calling for the May 2000 riots but later claiming he
did not expect the degree of violence that occurred. Much of the street violence is no
longer controlled by the PA, but by new armed activists, gaining popular support in
the region, who do not adhere to the orders of the PA and are even feared by the PA.
See Arieh 0' Sullivan, IDF Preparing for More Violence in Territories, JERUSALEM
POST, June 14, 2000, at 2. Fearful of the armed activists, PA security officials do not
enter certain parts of areas A and B, which are ostensibly under their control. See
Arieh O'Sullivan, Are SLA Weapons Ending Up in Nablus?, JERUSALEM POST, June
14,2000, at 3.
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stunning upset victory of Likud Party member Moshe Katsav over his
opponent Shimon Peres in the Israeli presidential elections held at
the end of July 2000.295 Peres, who has been a staunch supporter of,
and key participant in, the peace process, and who received a Nobel
Peace Prize for his efforts, was deprived of the opportunity to crown
his long service to Israel with the largely ceremonial role of Israel's
eighth President.' Presumably, his loss reflected, as Likud Party
chairman Ariel Sharon put it, "'an expression of deep disappointment
and great worry about Barak's [recent peace process] activities. ' '2"
Barak himself faced repeated "no-confidence" motions in the Israeli
Knesset, preliminary legislation for his government to be dissolved,
and early elections to be held as a result of what some Israelis believe
was Barak's "willingness to make too many concessions." 298
While Barak and Arafat must both consider the reaction of their
constituents when negotiating further agreements after Camp David
II, it is clear that Arafat is equally, if not more, concerned with the
opinion of the surrounding Arab states when it comes to reaching a
settlement on Jerusalem. According to Bilal al-Hassan of the
newspaper Al-Hayat, Arafat, en route to Camp David II, told
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that he had no intention of
discussing either Jerusalem or refugees, but, rather, wished to focus
on the interim status issues.299  Arafat also stated that further
agreements between himself and various Arab leaders would be
necessary before the issues of Jerusalem and refugees could even be
addressed.' This would account for Arafat's refusal to accept even
the surprisingly generous concessions Barak was willing to make at
Camp David II. The United States is now attempting to create an
"'Arab umbrella of legitimacy"' for Palestinian concessions in future
295. See Nina Gilbert & Gil Hoffman, Katsav Wins Upset Victory, JERUSALEM
POST, Aug. 1, 2000, at 1.
296. See Mark Lavie, Israel Gets Hawkish President (July 31, 2000)
<http://detnews.com/2000/nationl0007/31/nation-98487.htm>.
297. Greer Fay Cashman, Sharon Praises Peres, JERUSALEM PosT, Aug. 1, 2000, at
3.
298. David Franklin, Levy Ultimatum Expires Today, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 2,
2000, at 1. Ultimately, Barak resigned, announcing his intention of seeking a new
mandate from the electorate.
299. See Douglas Davis, Report: Arafat Didn't Want Summit to Deal With
Jerusalem, Refugees, JERUSALEM POST, July 30,2000, at 3.
300. See id.
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talks." ' Toward this goal, Clinton has called on the leaders of
Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to support a partial
agreement between Palestinians and Israelis while Assistant
Secretary of State Edward S. Walker visited various "Arab leaders
'to persuade them to soften Arafat's stance."' Only King Abdullah
II of Jordan was forthcoming with his response, attempting to
persuade Arafat to accept such a deal. 3  Palestinians say that
Mubarak has begun a campaign in the Arab world to "'work out the
Arab red lines,"' and that Arafat will not sign any agreement without
first consulting the Egyptian President.3' Meanwhile, four Kuwaiti
Islamist groups condemned the negotiations at Camp David and
claim that Moslems will not be bound to any agreement between
Arafat and Israel. 5  In a joint statement published in local
newspapers, they said, "The Palestinian cause is.. . the responsibility
of all Moslems and any compromise by Arafat or any other Arab
leader to the Jews on any part of Palestine has no legal value."'
They further urge the use of force against Israel as the only means by
which the Palestinians can "win back" Jerusalem.3°
It is clear that the Arab world will have to come to some kind of
consensus on the issues before the next round of talks take place if
they are to have any sort of value as far as achieving a lasting peace
with Israel. If not, Arafat may be unwilling to stand on his own in
reaching a compromise with Israel that will ultimately create a better
future for his people. So far it seems that Arafat is willing to risk
neither his personal security nor his political popularity to ensure a
lasting peace.'
What remains unclear is from what starting point the next round
of talks will take place. Clinton has said that he does not expect that
another summit will be held in the foreseeable future,' but when
301. Douglas Davis, US seeking 'Arab Umbrella' for PA Concessions, JERUSALEM
POST, July 30, 2000, at 2.
302. Id.
303. See id.
304. Lamia Lahoud, Mubarak Working out 'Arab Red Lines' for Camp David,




308. See Janine Zacharia & Danna Harman, Summit Collapses Without
Agreement, JERUSALEM POST, July 26, 2000, at 1.
309. See Harman, supra note 286.
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further negotiations do take place, it will be interesting to see whether
or not the three parties will hold to the idea that the concessions
made at Camp David II would be "all or nothing" and thus that
future negotiations would not start from suggestions put forth at the
summit. This "all or nothing" formula was agreed to so that the
individual parties "'wouldn't be exposed,"' as Clinton put it, and so
that they could take back any offers made if no agreement emerged."'
While Barak has repeatedly stressed that the offers he made at the
summit are now "null and void," it will be difficult, if he is still the
Israeli Prime Minister, to conceal his cards now that the Palestinians
know just how far he was willing to go.
31
Of course, the Sharm Memorandum, like the WRM before it, if
carried out faithfully by both parties, could have given renewed
momentum to the long dormant Oslo peace process. Clearly this was
the hope of the Clinton Administration, which has made prodigious
efforts, most recently the convening of the Camp David II summit, to
prevent the entire process from breaking apart. These efforts proved
insufficient and the timeframe for resolving the final status issues
expired. The daunting complexity of these remaining issues makes it
difficult to forecast a negotiated resolution of the 100-year-old
conflict, especially within the constantly narrowing window of time.
Perhaps what propels the two sides onwards, hopefully towards
peace, is a sense that the current reality cannot long survive and that
the status quo that preceded the peace process cannot, at a
sustainable political cost, be restored. The outcome will unfold as the
once taboo issues of borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and settlements,
recently formally placed on the negotiating table at Camp David II,
continue to be debated. 2
Postscript: The AI-Aqsa Intifada
The Israel-PA relationship deteriorated almost beyond
recognition during the period in which the author reviewed the proof
copy of this Article. Daily Palestinian violence directed at Israeli
targets313 prompted Barak to publicly question whether Israel had a
310. Id.
311. See After Camp David, JERUSALEM POST, July 27,2000, at 8.
312 See Saul Singer, Israel's Bravest Soldier Took Too Many Risks, WALL STREET
J., July 26,2000, at A26.
313. The Palestinians have almost invariably opened fire first. See, e.g., Interview
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partner for peace. Arafat's answer was blunt as, flush with support
gathered during his frenetic travels around the Arab and Islamic
worlds, 14 he responded by telling the television cameras that Barak
could "go to hell."3 '5
Notwithstanding the unparalleled unilateral concessions offered
by Barak at the July 2000 Camp David II summit,316 concessions
intended to induce a reluctant Arafat to terminate the conflict with a
final status agreement, the Palestinian leader apparently concluded
that he can achieve more through confrontation and violence than
through the give and take of a final round of negotiations.3"7 Israeli
Foreign Ministry Director General Alon Liel described Arafat's
conduct as follows: "'Arafat, in the last kilometer of the marathon, at
the finish line, turned around and started to run backward. Against
history, against the will of the world, against the interests of his own
people, and against logic. He didn't stop. He is running in the
opposite direction.
'' 31 8
with Neil Macdonald, Reporter for Canadian Broadcasting Co. Television, The
World at Six (Canadian Broad. Co. Radio Broadcast Transcript), Oct. 20,2000.
314. See Herb Keinon, Senior Security Official: Situation in Territories on Brink of
Anarchy, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 30, 2000, at 1. Arafat was so preoccupied with his
efforts to internationalize the conflict that he did not set foot in the West Bank
between October 3, 2000 and November 30, 2000. See id.
315. Patrick Bishop, Palestinian Teenagers Bear Brunt of Violence (Oct. 23, 2000)
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et?ac=005383914864783&rtmo=axaJ2JpL&atmo=ttttty
Kd&pg=/et/00/10/23/wmid323.html>.
316. See, e.g., Marcus Gee, Palestinians Squander Their Freedom, GLOBE & MAIL
(CANADA), Oct. 26, 2000; see also Charles Krauthammer, Arafat's War, JERUSALEM
POST, Oct. 8, 2000, at 6.
317. See Lamia Lahood, Fatah Promises Intifada Against Israeli Settlements,
JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 10, 2000, at 2. Prime Minister Barak stated,
"[T]here is an understanding in the Arab world ... that Arafat and the PA,
in their decision not to reach an agreement with us that was within reach, but
rather to choose the path of violence, have taken upon themselves a heavy
responsibility that changes the character of the [peace] process.... At the
moment the PA and Arafat have chosen the path of conflict in an attempt to
make us fold and to get us to surrender our vital interests through force."
Herb Keinon and Lamia Lahoud, Egyptian Foreign Minister Moussa: Current Peace
Process Is Over, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 25, 2000, at 1. Arafat may have a secondary
motivation-to deflect unrest caused by his corrupt and heavy-handed governance in
the PA. See, e.g., Daniel Klaidman et al., Something Rotten in Palestine, NEWSWEEK,
May 22, 2000, at 36. Palestinian activists, such as Tanzim leader Hussein a-Sheikh,
believe that gains in future negotiations will be greater following the riots, which
have made the Palestinians victims in the eyes of the world.
318. Herb Keinon, New Government Message: Arafat Running Backward,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 2,2000, at 4.
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In the first two months, the new violence claimed some 260
Palestinian and thirty-five Israeli lives.319 Despite recurrent efforts by
Clinton, whose formidable powers of persuasion had moved the
parties past previous impasses, the downward spiral toward armed
conflict continues virtually without respite.
This outburst has been more violent and protracted than other
episodes of violence during the peace process."2 , One major
difference between the current Al-Aqsa Intifada and its predecessor,
the original intifada of a decade ago, is the enormous increase of
Palestinian firepower, primarily in the form of tens of thousands of
assault rifles which were provided to their police and security forces
to enable them to keep public order and deter anti-Israel terrorism by
Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Israel has responded with a variety of
weapons and tactics, including limited use of tanks and helicopter
gunships, claiming that it was reacting with restraint given the
circumstances. 2
Acrimonious accusations crisscrossed the Israeli-Palestinian
political divide as Palestinians preferred to focus attention on their
mounting casualty toll rather than on larger questions like who
started the violence and who could have stopped it early on.
Meanwhile, in the background, the dozens of bilateral (Israeli-
Palestinian) and several trilateral (U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian)
committees created by the interim agreements simply stopped
functioning.3" Sometimes this was with a bang, as when the
319. See Keinon, supra note 314.
320. See IDF Spokesman's Office, The 'Ebb and Flow' According to Destination of
Incident 29/09-29/102000, Oct. 31, 2000; Margot Dudkevitch, 3209 Violent Incidents
in West Bank in October, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 1, 2000, at 3. Another report gave
the figure of 780 shooting incidents in the previous month. See Arieh O'Sullivan, Gil
Missile Used for First Time Against Beit Jallah, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 2,2000, at 2.
321. See Daniel Pipes, Intifada 11: What the U.S. Should Do, COMMENTARY, Dec.
2000, at 39. Two Israeli reserve soldiers were murdered by a Palestinian mob after
they took a wrong turn into Ramallah. See Andrew Morse et al., Israel Retaliates
(Oct. 12, 2000) <http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/
mideast_001012.html>. In retaliation Israeli helicopters fired missiles at PA targets
in Ramallah, but only after giving advance warning to the PA to enable evacuation of
the buildings. See id. Likewise, although handfuls of tanks have been posted at
various defensive positions, such as the Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo, they have
generally served a symbolic role. See Hugh Dellios, As Jerusalem Wall Rise, Israel
Warns of Long Battle, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 25,2000, at 1.
322. See generally Justus Reid Weiner, The Implementation of Legal Structures for
Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Pursuant to the Interim Peace Agreements, 26
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Palestinians bombed the District Coordination Office;' more often it
was with a whimper, as by simple failure to conduct meetings. Either
way, the net effect was that structures that were designed to work
through day-to-day problems proved useless precisely when they
were needed most.
Despite the violence, Israeli opinion polls revealed that 60% of
the public was still committed to the peace process. 4 By contrast, a
public opinion poll of Palestinians living on the West Bank revealed
alarming results. Eighty percent supported armed attacks against
Israeli targets, compared to 33% in 1995. Forty-one percent favored
attacks against any Israeli target, including civilians. Seventy-five
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 591 (2000). The Oslo peace process introduces a new angle to
the persistent conflict between the two populations and their stakes in the land they
consider their ancestral home. Distinct from earlier attempts at negotiating a Middle
Eastern peace, the Oslo interim agreements have developed a comprehensive
institutional structure and shared administrative control, principally in the form of
committees that were designed to work, out of the limelight, at solving day-to-day
problems. They were to address practical concerns, primarily the welfare and
security of both sides, and also to deal, inter alia, with the distribution of resources,
control of holy sites, economic development, airports, harbors, tourism, ecology and
archaeology. They were designed to bring together former enemies in their new role
as partners seeking to develop pragmatic solutions to the challenges they faced. Prior
to the current intifada some of the committees were successful in working through
problems; others were not. Since the outbreak of violence, these structures have
been essentially useless. See generally id.; see also Margot Dudkevitch, Violence
Persists, But Less Intense, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 5, 2000, at 2; Margot Dudkevitch,
Palestinians Ransack Evacuated Joseph's Tomb, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 8, 2000, at 1;
Nina Gilbert, Peres Slams Arafat's Handling of Joseph's Tomb, JERUSALEM POST,
Oct. 8, 2000, at 3; Margot Dudkeveitch, Border Policeman Murdered by Palestinian
Counterpart, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 2, 2000, at 5; Arieh O'Sullivan, IDF Considering
Ending Joint Patrols, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 5, 2000, at 2; Margot Dudkevitch &
Lamia Lahoud, Fatah Calls to Continue the Intifada, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 25, 2000,
at 1; Hanan Sher, Brief Encounter: Col. Gal Hirsch, JERUSALEM REP., Nov. 20, 2000,
at 16.
323. District Coordination Offices, like the one in the Gaza Strip at Neve
Dekalim, which was bombed, were set up under the interim peace agreements to
facilitate problem-solving via meetings between IDF officers and their Palestinian
counterparts. See Margot Dudkevitch, Two Soldiers Killed in Gaza, JERUSALEM
POST, Nov. 24, 2000, at Al. These offices were a place where, even after the new
intifada started, a certain degree of cooperation in the field still existed. In the
aftermath of the bombing in which one IDF soldier was killed and two were
wounded, Israel declared, "The Palestinians carried out a despicable attack on
Military personnel with whom they worked side by side over the past seven years."
In response, the IDF submitted a formal request for the Palestinians to remove their
personnel from such coordination offices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. See id.
324. See Latest on the Peace Process (Nov. 28, 2000)
<http://www.southwestern.edu/-kotarskj/latest.html>.
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percent favored the continuation of the Intifada and 60% said there is
no chance for peaceful co-existence between Palestinians and
Israelis.3" These statistics are all the more shocking in that they were
collected after the progressive redeployment of the IDF had taken
the army out of the cities, towns and villages where the vast majority
of Palestinians live and work. Underlining this reality is the fact that
about 98% of Palestinians live in areas under PA civil administration
which have their local needs addressed by the PA, without interacting
with the IDF.326
It is beyond the scope of this Article to delve in depth into the
reasons for, and nature of, this new phase of the conflict. Suffice it to
state that the Palestinian violence3" and ongoing incitement 3  negates
the original purpose of the Oslo peace process-to resolve differences
through negotiation rather than violence. As Arafat proclaimed in
325. See Lamia Lahoud, Bir Zeit Poll Shows Rising Support for Armed Attacks,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 14, 2000, at 3; see also Gil Hoffman, Palestinian Poll Result
Worries Politicians on Right and Left, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 15,2000, at 4.
326. See Krauthammer, supra note 316; see also Dan Izenberg, Israel Searches for
More Humane Riot Control Tools, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 16,2000, at 2.
327. See, e.g., IDF Spokesman's Office, supra note 320; Dudkevitch, supra note
320.
328. See Steve Weizman, All the News That's Fit to Incite, JERUSALEM POST, Nov.
17, 2000, at B2. In some instances, children have in fact been given or have otherwise
obtained guns. See, e.g., Arab Boy Caught With Gun, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 20,
2000, at 4. According to a report published by the International Christian Embassy
in Jerusalem, the frequently made claim that Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon
caused the riots by his visit to the Temple Mount on the eve of the Jewish new year
(Rosh Ha'shana) ignores the evidence that the Palestinians were planning to launch a
jihad. Try to Remember Those Threats in September (Oct. 10, 2000)
<http://www.icej.org/cgi-local/icej-goto.pl?type=NEWS&artid=20001010OeOT6dimh
MIAAHnigRw>. The report notes:
A simple pilgrimage by a Jew to Judaism's holiest site has starkly exposed
Muslim intolerance and Arafat's feigned commitment to peace, as he has
used it as a ruse for enflaming an uprising under the supreme rallying cry-
"defend A1-Aqsa."
The morning after Sharon's visit, over 20,000 Muslim radicals-many
youths ferried in from Islamic hotbeds in the PA areas and the Galilee-
converged at the Al-Aqsa mosque for Friday prayers. The Grand Mufti,
Sheikh Ibrahim Ekrima, referred to Sharon as the "Jewish butcher of
Muslims," who was challenging more than one billion Muslims all over the
world. The acid-tongued Mufti appealed for a pan-Islamic ruler to declare a
Jihad "to eradicate the Jews from Palestine." As the throng emerged from
the mosque, they set off a lethal rampage of violence that is proving to be an
unremitting flame.
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his September 9, 1993 letter to Yitzhak Rabin:
The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of
Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of
peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which
endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the PLO renounces the
use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume
responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to
assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline
violators.2
And as discussed above, the Oslo II Agreement, the Hebron
Protocol, the WRM, and the Sharm Memorandum were dedicated, in
large part, to giving concrete expression to the PA's obligation to
combat terrorism and incitement to violence.30 The WRM, in
329. See Letter from Yasser Arafat, supra note 52.
330. See Hillary Mann, Sharm El Sheikh Revisited-One Year Later (Mar. 13,
1997) <http://www.washingtoninstitute.orgwatchlPolicywatchlpolicywatchl997/
240.htm>. Article II(A)(3)(a) of the WRM, captioned "Preventing Incitement,"
states that
pursuant to Article XXII(1) of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the
Record, the Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of
incitement to violence or terror, and establishing mechanisms for acting
systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror. This
decree will be comparable to the existing Israeli legislation which deals with
the same subject.
WRM, supra note 18, art. II(A)(3)(a), at 7. Arafat has personally engaged in
incitement with regularity, despite his commitments under the interim peace
agreements. See Israel Government Press Office, Palestinian Non-Compliance with
the Wye River Memorandum (Feb. 2, 1998) <http://www.likud.nl/viol25.htmI>. For
example, a few months after signing the Declaration of Principles, he was taped
during a speech in a Mosque exhorting those present to wage a jihad with the goal of
liberating Jerusalem. See Yasser Arafat Speech on Jerusalem to South African
Muslims in Johannesburg, South Africa (May 10, 1994), in 24 J. OF PALESTINIAN
STUD. 131, 132 (1994). Arafat also likened the Declaration of Principles to the peace
agreement signed by the Prophet Mohammed with the Quraysh tribe, which was
abrogated by Mohammed ten years later. See id. Arafat has honored the memory of
slain Palestinian master terrorists by publicly referring to them as martyrs. See Ze'ev
B. Begin, Oslo and Mideast Logic, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 17, 1996, at 6. A PA
minister accused Israel of responsibility for two of the Islamic Jihad suicide bombers
in Gaza who had exploded themselves near buses filled with Israeli schoolchildren.
See Munir Abu Rizek, Shin Bet Agent Accused of Planning Suicide Bombings,
JERUSALEM TIMES, May 9, 1997, at 1. PA propaganda even included an accusation
by the Palestinian Representative to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that
Israel had infected by injection 300 Palestinian children with HIV. See Uriel
Heilman, UN Won't Counter Palestinian AIDS Allegation, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 11,
1997, at 2. The most recent example of Arafat's attitude towards the ongoing
incitement and violence is his carrying a submachine gun when he appears in public.
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particular, specified five separate, quite explicit steps that the
Palestinians agreed to implement.33'
Yet in today's explosive political climate, and at the very time
restraint and fidelity to signed agreements is most needed, and when
incitement and terrorism pose the greatest threat, the solemn, signed
documents appear altogether ineffective. Rather than preventing
armed gunmen from taking over the streets, Arafat appears to be
pandering to them in order to preserve his role as the indispensable
leader of the Palestinian masses. Reconciliation, in Arafat's parlance,
appears to apply to his efforts to mend fences with his Islamist and
left-wing Palestinian critics, rather than to bridge the PA-Israeli
chasm.332 Thus, instead of honoring the interim peace agreements by
jailing known terrorists or transferring them to Israel to face trial, the
PA has thrown open the doors of its jails, permitting them to once
See Margot Dudkevitch, Arafat Brandishes Weapon on His Return to Gaza,
JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 5, 2000, at 1. This was viewed as a call to arms. See Lamia
Lahoud, Palestinians See Gun-Toting Arafat as Making a Call to Arms, JERUSALEM
POST, Dec. 6, 2000, at 2.
331. Article II(A)(1) of the WRM, titled "Outlawing and Combating Terrorist
Organizations," states,
(a) The Palestinian side will make known its policy of zero tolerance for
terror and violence against both sides.
(b) A work plan developed by the Palestinian side will be shared with the
U.S. and thereafter implementation will begin immediately to ensure the
systematic and effective combat of terrorist organizations and their
infrastructure.
(c) In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a
U.S.-Palestinian committee will meet bi-weekly to review the steps being
taken to eliminate terrorist cells and the support structure that plans,
finances, supplies and abets terror. In these meetings, the Palestinian side
will inform the U.S. fully of the actions it has taken to outlaw all
organizations (or wings of organizations, as appropriate) of a military,
terrorist or violent character and their support structure and to prevent them
from operating in the areas under its jurisdiction.
(d) The Palestinian side will apprehend the specific individuals suspected of
perpetrating acts of violence and terror for the purpose of further
investigation, and prosecution and punishment of all persons involved in acts
of violence and terror.
(e) A U.S.-Palestinian committee will meet to review and evaluate
information pertinent to the decisions on prosecution, punishment or other
legal measures which affect the status of individuals suspected of abetting or
perpetrating acts of violence and terror.
WRM, supra note 18, art. II(A)(1), at 6-7.
332. See Michael Widlanski, Special Report: Voice of Palestine Coverage of Peres-
Arafat Agreement and Follow-up Announcement (Nov. 2, 2000) <http://www.
israelbehindthenews.com/Nov-02-00.htm#Contents>.
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again ply their deadly trade.333 Times like this remind this author of
Ambrose Bierce's cynical definition of "peace" as "a period of
cheating between two periods of fighting."3'
333. The PA's sudden release of Hamas senior leaders and bomb-makers
prompted warnings that Arafat has given the green light for renewed suicide attacks.
See David Zev Harris et al., Hamas Political Leader: All Israelis Are Legitimate
Targets, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 12, 2000 at 1; see also Jonathan Krashinsky, IDE"
Senior PA Officials Involved with Hamas, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 17, 2000, at 4.
Subsequent car bombings by Islamic Jihad in Jerusalem and Hadera claimed
numerous Israeli casualties. See David Rudge, Car Bombing Kills Two in Hadera,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 23, 2000, at 1. The PA denied responsibility for the
bombings. See Lamia Lahoud, PA Disavows Attack, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 23,
2000, at 3. By disclaiming knowledge of or responsibility for these attacks, Arafat
raises further doubts regarding what might, in the best of circumstances, be gained
from negotiating with him. Moreover, The PA's obligation to pursue those who
perpetrate acts of terror against Israeli targets is unequivocal. The Oslo II
Agreement and its predecessor, the Cairo Agreement, give Israel exclusive criminal
jurisdiction over terrorist attacks against Israelis. See, e.g., Oslo II, supra note 19,
Annex IV, art. II(7)(f)(2); Cairo Agreement, supra note 19, Annex III, art.
(II)(7)(f)(2); Peace Watch, Disturbing Pattern of PA Non-Compliance Concerning the
Transfer of Terror Suspects to Israel; None of the 16 Terror Suspects Requested by
Israel Have Been Turned Over, Sept. 19, 1995.
334. AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICrIONARY (T. Y. Crowell 1979) (c. 1911),
available at (last modified Jan. 31, 1997)
<http://www.rabi.phys.columbia.edu/-matmat/html/dict/p.html>.
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